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Karesh: Partnership Law and the Uniform Partnership Act in South Carolina

THE SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
REVIEW SECTION
PARTNERSHIP LAW AND THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA-Part 3
COLEMAN KARESH*

PART V.
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF A PARTNER

SECTION 24. Extent of Property Rights of a Partner.
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in
specific partnership property, (2) his interest in the
partnership, and (3) his right to participate in the management.
SECTION 25. Nature of a Partner's Right in Specific
Partnership Property.
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific
partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this act
and to any agreement between the partners, has an
equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has
no right to possess such property for any other purpose
without the consent of his partners.
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the
assignment of rights of all the partners in the same
property.
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
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on a claim against the partnership. When partnership
property is attached for a partnership debt the partners, or any of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific
partnership property vests in the surviving partner or
partners, except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests
in his legal representative. Such surviving partner or
partners, or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership
property for any but a partnership purpose.
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to
widows, heirs, or next of kin.
SECTION 26. Nature of Partner's Interest in the Partnership. A partner's interest in the partnership is his
share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal
property.
SECTION 27. Assignment of Partner's Interest. (1) A
conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership
does not of itself dissolve the partnership, nor, as against
the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle
the assignee, during the continuance of the partnership,
to interfere in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the
assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the
profits to which the assigning partner would otherwise
be entitled.
(2) In case of a dissolution of the partnership, the
assignee is entitled to receive his assignor's interest and
may require an account from the date only of the last
account agreed to by all the partners.
SECTION 28. Partner's Interest Subject to Changing
Order.
(1) On due application to a competent court by any
judgment creditor of a partner, the court which entered
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the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court, may
charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment
of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with
-interest thereon; and may then or later appoint a receiver
of his share of the profits, and of any other money due
or to fall due to him in respect of the partnership, and
make all other orders, directions, accounts and inquiries
which the debtor partner might have made, or which the
circumstances of the case may require.
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time
before foreclosure, or in case of a sale being directed by
the court may be purchased without thereby causing a
dissolution:
(a) With separate property, by any one or more of
the partners, or
(b) With partnership property, by any one or more
of the partners with the consent of all the partners
whose interests are not so charged or sold.
(3) Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if any, under the exemption laws, as regards his interest in the partnership.
The five Sections set out are grouped here because of the
close and interacting relationship among them. Section 24 is
merely an enumeration of a partner's property rights, which
(except for the third there stated-"-his right to participate
in the management") are specifically dealt with in Sections
25 and 26. The right of participation in management is virtually a restatement of the rule expressed in and discussed under
Section 18 (e). Sections 27 and 28 are sequences, in special
cases, of material covered in or affected by Sections 25 and 26.
Nature of Partner's Tenancy. Subsection (1) of Section
25, in describing a partner as "a tenant in partnership", creates, for all practical purposes, a new kind of tenancy, the
incidents of which are spelled out precisely thereafter. It may
be that the nomenclature is not so much the fabrication of a
new kind of interest as it is the giving of a new name, but the
designation is the product of a need for a suitable characterization which will indicate the distinctive and peculiar ownership of partners. With the establishment or recognition of
tenancy in partnership, the uncertainty that has previously
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existed in determining whether the co-ownership of partners
is joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or a hybrid of the two,
disappears-at least as partnerships are affected by the Act.
The South Carolina cases have followed an irregular course
in denominating the tenancy of partners, although in most,
if not all of them, the result reached would probably have been
the same whatever label may have been attached.
Outside of South Carolina, the inclination has been to treat
firm persnZ property either as belonging to the firm as such,
or to the partners collectively, or to the partners as joint
tenants. 70 Fundamentally, the local view seems to have been
that the ownership is joint. In Kinsler v. McCants,70 4 it is said
(at p. 47) : "It is elementary law that, by the contract of
partnership, the partners acquire a joint interest in the effects
of the partnership ....
The possession of any part of the
assets, by either partner, does not sever the joint property,
nor vest a separate interest in him." The point of difference
in this and other cases is how far the customary incidents of
joint tenancy extend; more specifically, the incident of survivorship. Since the transmission of interests on death is
specially dealt with in the next topic, a consideration of these
cases will be had there.
The real property of a partnership also falls into a conflicting pattern in the local cases. Except where the title to firm
property is in one partner, the holding during the lifetime of
the partners has been described on occasion as joint,70 5 and
elsewhere as a tenancy in common.70 6 Much depends upon the
form in which the transfer runs to the partners. In Boyce v.
Coster,70 7 a deed to copartners and to the survivor or survivors of them was held to create a joint tenancy, though
viewed in equity as being a tenancy in common (i.e., so far as
. 703. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 150-153; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 40,
n. 65; 40 Am. Jur. 202; note, 1 A. L. R. 564, 567.

704. Note 196, supra,

705. Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 536: "Lands owned by a partnership are not held by the members as tenants in common, but as joint
tenants."
706. Bowman v. Bailey, 20 S. C. 550, 553 (1883): "It may be laid down
as a general proposition that, if real estate be purchased by two or
more parties and paid out of partnership funds, it will be regarded in
law as held by the several parties as tenants in common..."
Most American courts treat the ownership as that of tenants in common. See CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 40; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed.),
§ 445; THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (Penn. Ed.), § 1844; PowELL, REAL
PROPERTY, § 138.

707. Note 173, supra.
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the beneficial interests were concerned). And even where a
joint tenancy as at common law is created, the statute abolishing the incident of survivorship may have the net effect of
producing a tenancy in common upon the death of one of the
70 8
The more important consequences of the
joint owners.

partners' tenancy in real estate will also be treated hereafter
in the next topic.
Whatever may have been the older classifications of the
co-ownership of the partners, the recognition of the partners'
equities took the ownership out of the ordinary categories of
joint or common tenancies and effectively modified them. The
adoption of the Act sends into discard these earlier tenancies,
however - or however accurately - they might have been
termed: the tenancy in partnership becomes the authoritative
classification, and the detailed incidents the prescribed ones.
Deceased Partner's Interest. Under subsection (2) (d) of
Section 25, the right of survivorship is specifically declared.
No distinction is here drawn between real and personal property. In ordaining survivorship, the Act makes certain what
was previously uncertain as to firm personal property, and
changes the law as to real property.
The South Carolina cases-taken together-leave their position in doubt as they view the devolution of a deceased
partner's interest in firm personalty. Although the general
rule in the United States, aside from statutes, puts the legal
title to firm personalty in the survivor, 70 9 the local cases as a
whole-at least the earlier ones-while seeming to recognize
the joint tenancy, reject the notion of survivorship. In Fisher
v. Tucker 7 10 it is said that on the death of a partner "his representatives become tenants in common with the survivor."
But, in Boyce v. Coster,71 - the Court declares: "Partners in

trade are, at law, joint tenants of the partnership stock and
effects, with the right of survivorship and its incidents. But
708. § 8911, S. C. CODE (1942): "Where any person shall be, at the
time of his or her death, seized or possessed of any estate in joint
tenancy, the same shall be adjudged to be severed by the death of the

joint tenant and shall be distributable as if the same were a tenancy
in common." This Section (enacted in 1791, 5 STAT. 163) was construed
as working a severance between partners in Reed v. Kennedy, 2 STROBHART'S LAw 67 (S. C. 1848).
709.

MECHEM,

PARTNERSHIP,

§ 402; CRANE,

PARTNERSHIP,

§§ 65, 83;

40 Am. Jur. 337.
710. Note 280, supra, at 171.
111. Note 173, supra, at 30.
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in equity the joint estate is subject to the maxim, jus accreseendi in mercatores locum non habet"-the right of survivorship does not exist among merchants." 12 A variation ap7 3
pears in Moffatt v. Thomson: 1
The principle is as old, at least as the time of Lord Coke,
that copartners constitute an exception to the rule as to
the jus accrescendi amongst joint tenants. . . . Though
they are joint tenants of all the partnership stock during
their lives there is no survivorship either at law or in
equity"14 (emphasis supplied). It follows that, upon the
decease of one of several partners, his share of the stock
and effects of the partnership, subject to the partnership
debts, devolves to his personal representatives, who thereupon become, both at law and in equity, tenants in com71 5
mon with the surviving partner.
It is to be noticed that the reference in the cases is to "stock
and effects," which may be taken to mean chattels as distinguished from choses in action. The latter, according to the
law of joint rights and obligations, pass to the survivor, subject to a duty to account. It seems, on general authority, that,
conceding the worth of the maxim denying survivorship
among partners, the rule does not apply to choses in actionat least so far as the legal title is concerned.716 The South
Carolina cases clearly put the title to firm choses in action in
the survivor for purposes of collection and enforcement.717
And when the survivor has died, his legal representative succeeds to the title, subject to the same duties. 718
Despite the assertion in the early cases that the survivor
does not take the whole title to firm personalty, there are
712. BouviER LAW DICT. (8th Ed.), 2141; LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (9th
Ed.), 428.
713. Note 562, supra, at 160.

714. To the same effect see LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (9th Ed.), 428.
715. This excerpt is quoted with approval in Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note
269, supra, at 117.
716. See LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIP (9th Ed.), 430.
717. Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra, at 48: "The legal title to
the choses in action, which belonged to the partnership, becomes vested
in the survivor. * * * The representative of the deceased partner has
no legal interest or title in the choses in action which have been in
possession of the deceased partner at the time of his death." See, also,
Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra; Younts v. Starnes, note 487, supra. As
to money, the result is the same-Knox v. Shepler, note 563, supra, at
596: "Certainly at law he, as surviving partner, is entitled to the whole
fund."
718. Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra.
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statements to the contrary elsewhere ;719 and, practically, the
proposition is incompatible with the undeniable right of a
surviving partner to sell and transfer firm personalty in
liquidation-a result which could hardly follow without his
having title and which is not to be ascribed simply to a power.
It is true that cases speak of the right of a partner "to take
and hold" 720 the partnership assets for purposes of winding
up-something which is not synonymous with title-but when
they also speak of reducing the assets to money, what is contemplated with personal property is a transfer by the survivor, which would be ineffectual without title. That there is
something more than merely taking and administering is to
be found in an older case, White v. Union Ins. Co.: 72 1 "Upon
the death of one of the copartners, the partnership is dissolved . . . and the joint effects are cast upon the survivor
afterwards, for the purpose of paying off the joint debts, and
then for an equitable distribution afterwards, if any surplus
remains. And for this purpose, the survivor has a right to sell
and dispose of all the remaining stock of the copartnership,
and such sale is unquestionably good and valid in law." Altogether, it may be questioned whether the doctrine of nonsurvivorship as to personal property ever had a real foothold
in South Carolina, and it may be surmised, in view of the
practicalities and practices, that in fact it was obsolete almost
from the time it was declared in this state. In any event, the
declaration of survivorship in subsection 2(d) removes for
future purposes any lingering doubt as to the transmission of
firm personalty. The whole title is in the survivor.
From what has been said as to the nature of the holdings
of partners in real estate, it is reasonably apparent that at
common law the devolution of the interest of a deceased partner will depend upon the character of that holding-i.e., as a
joint tenancy or as a tenancy in common. The maxim denying
survivorship among merchants has no meaning as to real
estate. If the tenancy in real estate is joint, the devolution will
be correspondingly so at law. If the tenancy is in common, the
devolution will take that course. "The legal estate or interest
719. Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra, at 459: "When a partnership is
dissolved by the death of one of the partners, the survivor becomes the

legal owner of the assets of the partnership
720. Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, supra, at 160; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd,

note 269, supra,at 114.
721. Note 307, supra,at 559.
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in partnership real estate devolves according to the nature and
tenure thereof, and according to the general rules of real estate applicable thereto." 722 But, as has been seen, the statute
abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies (except, perhaps,
where the transfer runs specifically to the grantees and the
survivor) will convert the estate into a tenancy in common
on the death of one of the partners. 723 The rule, therefore, has
bean that ordinarily on the death of a partner, title to his share
of firm real estate will pass not to the survivor but to the
decedent's heirs or devisees, subject to partnership equities
and in effect impressed with a trust, the fulfillment of which
can be compelled by the survivor.7 24 The survivor might, in
liquidation, sell the real estate, but a deed would pass only his
fractional legal title and the whole equitable title of the firm;
hence, only by joinder of the heirs or devisees in a conveyance, or by compelling a transfer of their interests through
court action, could legal title be conferred on a purchaser. 725
Section 25 works a different result. For, by eliminating
joint tenancy and tenancy in common and erecting in their
lplace tenancy in partnership, and by prescribing survivorship,
the devolution must take place as directed. On death of a partner, therefore, the whole legal title vests in the survivor; and
a deed made by the survivor in the course of the settlement of
the partnership concerns will carry the legal and beneficial
title.720 Of major importance too is the provision that on the

death of the survivor, in whom title had vested, the whole
title thereupon passes to his personal representative-not to
his heirs or devisees, nor back into the heirs, devisees or personal representative of the deceased partner. The deed of the
722. Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 245. The quotation is taken

from 30 Cyc., 625. It is repeated now in 68 C.J. S. 776.

723. See note 708, supra.
724. Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, supra, at 197; Schenk v. Lewis,
mote 151, supra. In the United States the rule generally, in the absence
of statute, is the same. MECHEm, PARTNERSHIP, § 169; THOiMPSON, REAL
PROPERTY (Perm. Ed.), § 1844; PowELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 138; 68 C.
J. S. 777; 40 Am. Jur. 33.
725. Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra. See, also, the text citations in
-aote 724, supra.
726. Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79, 137 N. E. 446 (1922); Davis v.
Hutchinson, 36 Fed. 2d 309 (C. C. A. 9, Alaska, 1929). See, also, CRANE,
PARTNERSHIP, §§ 83, and 45: "The surviving partner may dispose of
the property, including real estate, without any joinder in conveyances
by heirs, devisees or widow of the deceased partner. He needs no aid
from the courts to enable him to liquidate real estate interests." See,
also, POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 139.
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survivor's representative, if otherwise proper, would carry
the legal and beneficial interests.
One item of practical concern needs to be noted here. The
assumed fact throughout has been that the property is partnership property. The fact is self-revealed if the particular
conveyance by which the partners acquired title ran to the
firm by name or to the partners specifically designated as
such. It has already been seen-in dealing with partnership
property under Section 8-that property owned by the partners may be owned by them in tenancy in common as individuals, even though purchased with partnership funds, or
used for firm purposes (its use being contributed). Since the
co-ownership of partners is thus in. a sense ambiguous, a deed
by the surviving partner of property acquired by the partners
in a conveyance not calling them partners, or not running to
the firm, would be good if it was the fact that the property
was firm property. But a purchaser cannot authoritatively
assay facts, and the survivor's declaration or recital would
not establish the fact even if it were so. Even if the purchaser
were satisfied that the property was firm property, succeeding purchasers might not be. The prudent course in any such
case, as a practical matter, is to have a joinder by the heirs
or devisees, or judicial establishment of the fact of firm
ownership-before, rather than after, the purchase.
Where title stands in the name of the firm, and since, as
7 27
it
has been seen, title can be conveyed only in that name,
would seem that on the death of a partner an effective conveyance could be made in the name of the firm by the
survivor. 7 25

No specific mention is made in Section 25 of the situation
where title to firm property is in the name of only one partner. As has been seen-in the discussion under Section 8he would in effect be holding in trust for the firm. If his
copartner were to die first, no difficulty is presented: the
survivor has the legal title necessary for a transfer.7 2 8a But
if he, the title-holder, dies first, the question is not so simple.
727. Section 8(3) of the Act; and see the discussion of that Section
in the text.
728. See the remarks of the draftsman of the Act, William Draper
Lewis: 24 YALE L. J. 617, 625 (1915). There seem to be no cases putting
the matter in issue.
'728a. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 169.
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Aside from the Act, there is no doubt that on his death the
whole legal interest would pass to his heirs or devisees, impressed with a trust which the survivor could enforce 729 -a result produced in the same fashion as the vesting of an undivided legal interest in heirs or devisees of a deceased partner
holding as tenant in common. Whether an opposite result
would be reached under the Act is problematic, and there
seems to be no authority interpreting the Act in such a set of
facts. Even though legal title may be in one partner only, the
beneficial ownership is in the firm; and the language of the
Act certainly would permit the passage of the whole beneficial
interest to the survivor for purposes of settlement. It might
not be reading too much into the words in subsection 2 (d),
"his right in specific partnership property vests in the surviving partner," to include the legal title which the deceased
partner had; but the lack of court opinion suggests caution
on the score. The absence of precise treatment in the Act, and
the want of judicial authority, would probably justify a
prospective purchaser in rejecting a conveyance from the survivor by reason of doubt as to the effective transfer of the
legal title; and the safer course would be, naturally, for him
to insist upon either a voluntary joinder by the heirs or
devisees of the deceased title-holder or a court-directed transfer of their interests. Again, as has already been noted, the
fact of firm ownership could be established conclusively only
through judicial determination; and no prudent purchaser
would undertake to substitute his own judgment for the safer
and binding judgment of a court.
Both under the Act and outside it, if there is no appearance
of firm ownership and the deceased partner was apparently
the sole owner, or owner of an absolute-undivided interest, a
purchaser from the heirs or devisees who could otherwise
qualify as a bona fide purchaser would be protected against
the survivor and firm claimants. These are the necessary accompaniments of the provisions of Section 10-as they deal
with the conveyance of real property of the partnership; and,
even if the consequences cannot be attributed to that Section,
that conclusion must emerge from the fact of the appearance
of personal ownership-whether in the partner himself or his
729. 68 C. J. S. 777, 779.
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heirs or devisees--and the operation of the bona fide pur7 30
chaser rule.
Nature of Partner's Interest in Partnership. The declaration in Section 26 that a "partner's interest in the partnership
is his share of the profits and surplus" is a restatement in
different terms of an almost axiomatic principle-that the
share of a partner in the assets of the partnership is what
remains after the payment of firm debts and the adjustment
of firm equities.7 3 ' A partnership-in the sense that a partner has a property interest in it-is a complex of assets and of
interacting rights and duties, and it is only the residue which
is left after the process of subjecting the assets to the action
of rights and duties that belongs to a partner. South Carolina
authority in keeping with the rule is ample. A typical expression, adequate for the purpose, is found in Knox v.
Shepler :732 "In equity, the interest of a partner in the partnership property is a share of the surplus that may remain after
winding up the affairs of the partnership and paying off all
its debts." Other cases use comparable language embodying
7 33
the same idea.
Just as the shares of the partners in relation to each other
are worked out on the basis of the rule, so is the position of
firm and separate creditors as related to their resort to partnership property. The subordination of separate creditors to
firm creditors in firm property is justified in the South Caro730. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 139. See the discussion of the rights
of purchasers from partners under Section 8.
731. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 143-145; 68 C. J. S. 525; 40 Am. Jur.
209.
732. Note 563, supra,at 596.
733. Seabrook v. Rose, note 131, supra, at 556 (of 2 Hill's Equity):
"The interest of each partner in the partnership in his share in the
surplus after the settlement of partnership accounts;" Hammond v.
Aiken, note 243, supra: "His rights depend upon a settlement of the

accounts, and the closing of the balance sheet;" Moffatt v. Thomson,
note 562, supra, at 161: "Nothing can be considered as the share of a
partner but his proportion of the residue, after an account of what

has been taken and advanced;" Kuhne v. Law, note 196, supra, at 25:
...
the right subsisting between the partners, under which each partner is entitled to only his share of the surplus after the payment of

the debts and settlement of the accounts of the firm"; Blair v. Black,

31 S. C. 346, 357, 9 S. E. 1033, 17 Am. St. Rep. 30 (1889): ". . . the
individual members have no interest until the partnership is settled."

See, also, Boyce v. Coster, note 173, supra; Rose v. Izard, note 99,
supra; Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra.

As has already been seen, in the discussion of the Partner's Lien,

under Section 18, the reduction of a partner's interest to a residual
share is brought about through the employment of a so-called lien avail-

able to the other partners.
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lina cases by the postulate that, until firm debts are paid,
there is no separate share in the property which separate
creditors can reach; or, to put it another way, only the share
which remains after partnership debts are paid is the share
of the partner, and that share alone is available to his separate
creditors.7 34 The priority of firm creditors, though not represented by a specific lien, is a derivative of a partner's right
to have firm property applied to firm debts, and any claim of
a copartner, or his transferee or creditor, is subordinate to
that equity735 A creditor of a partner, or an assignee of a

partner's interest in specific property or of his interest in the
partnership, takes, therefore, subject to the prior rights of
firm creditors and the paramount equities of the other
partners.7 3 6
734. Wardlaw v. Gray, note 369, supra, at 113: "The private creditors
of a partner cannot go against the partnership funds beyond the debtor's
interest in them, which is for the balance left after the payment of the
partnership debts"; Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, sulyra, at 510: "The
only interest which [the deceased partner's] estate would have in the
partnership assets would be his share of the dry balance after the copartnership debts were paid"; Hutzler v. Phillips, note 176, supra, at
150: "The property of the firm is not liable for the separate debts of
a member--only the interest of the member is liable, which is nothing
until the firm debts are paid"; Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 537:
".... an individual creditor, who is only entitled to participate in what
may come back to his debtor after the settlement of partnership debts";
Ex Parte Karish, 32 S. C. 437, 439, 11 S. E. 298, 17 Am. St. Rep. 865
(1889): "There can be no doubt that, until the partnership creditors
are provided for, the individual partners have no interest-that is, can
claim no individual right in the partnership assets, they being entitled
to their shares in whatever may remain after the partnership creditors
are provided for"; Calhoun v. Bank, note 18, supra, at 365: "No partner
has any interest in the partnership assets until all the partnership creditors have been provided for"; Bank of Anderson v. Allen, note 505,
supra, at 172; ". . . All of the partnership assets . . . were subject to
the partnership obligations, and (the partner) was only entitled to an
accounting for his interest after payment of all partnership obligations."
The cited cases are given only because they state the theory which
prefers firm creditors to separate creditors. The theory is not stated but
is inherent in many other cases which involve priorities in the marshalling of firm and individual estates, and they will be hereafter dealt with.
Typical and controlling is this statement, from White v. Union Ins. Co.,
note 307, supra, at 559: "The co-partnership effects ought to go to the
payment of the co-partnership debts in the first place, and if there be
a surplus, then to the private debts of each copartner afterwards, in
proportion to his share of the joint funds."
These cases are not to be taken as treating a partner's share as the
surplus after firm debts are paid and nothing more: they are concerned with priorities of firm and separate creditors only, and for their
purposes the statements are sufficient, but incomplete. Partnership
equities-in favor of the partners-take precedence over individual
rights, as has already been seen.
735. Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 536.
736. Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra-transfer of partner's interest
in firm, subject to copartners' equities; Boyce v. Coster, note 173, supra
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In the discussion of the priorities between firm judgment
creditors and separate judgment creditors-under the treatment of Effect of Judgment in connection with Section 15 of
the Act-it has been seen that a senior judgment creditor of
a firm takes precedence in separate property over a later
separate judgment creditor. As to firm property, no similar
seniority based on antecedence in time is accorded a separate
judgment creditor. Hence, even where there has been an
execution on firm property by a separate judgment creditor
prior to execution on it by a firm judgment creditor, the latter
will be preferred.73 7 The reason, of course, is the deferred
existence of a partner's interest until the payment of partnership debts and the settlement of firm accounts. For that matter, a separate judgment creditor is subordinated to the rights
of a firm creditor whose claim has not been reduced to judgment.78 8 Although there is this recognition in the South Carolina cases of the prior right of firm creditors as against transferees or separate judgment creditors of an individual partner, a court of law would not give such priority to the firm
creditors (at least where they had not already obtained liens),
and relief on that score could be afforded only in equity.73 9
The effect of the attempted transfer of a partner's rights
in specific firm property and the attempted subjection of
-transfer of partner's interest in specific firm property, subject to copartners' equities; Rose v. Izard, note 99, supra-mortgage of partners'
interests in specific firm property, subject to firm creditors' and copartners' equities; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra-generally, firm
creditors superior to separate creditors; Brown v. Bradley, 131 S. C.
268, 127 S. E. 210 (1924)-assignment of partner's interest in funds
derived from execution sale of firm property, subordinate to firm creditors. See note, 6 A. L. R. 162.
737. Crawford v. Baum, '12 RICHARDSON'S LAW 75, 77 (S. C. 1859):
... his (partner's) quantum of interest is a distributive share of the
surplus remaining after the partnership debts are paid." The general
rule is in accord: note, 75 A. L. R. 997, 1004.
738. See Brown v. Bradley, note 736, supra; Schatzel v. Bolton, 2
MCCORD's LAW 478, 13 Am. Rep. 748 (S. C. 1823); Schatzel v. Bolton,
3 McCOnD's LAW 33 (S. C. 1826); Sniffer v. Sass, 14 RICHARDSoN'S LAW
20, 24 (S. C. 1828); Bowden v. Schatzel, BAImuY's EQUITY 360 (S. C.
1831) ; Knox v. Shepler, note 563, supra; Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra,
at 536.
739. Wilson v. Bowden, 8 RICHARDSoN's LAW 9 (S.C. 1854)-separate
and successive assignments by partners of interests in firm property,
held valid at law against firm creditors subsequently attaching; Norris
v. Vernon, 8 RICHARDSON'S LAW 13 (S. C. 1854)-same; Hooks v. Byrd,
10 RICHARDSoN's LAW 120 (S. C. 1856)-sheriff selling firm property
in execution against individual partner compelled in action at law, over
firm creditor's protest, to pay over to separate judgment creditor; Henderson v. Hadden, 12 RICHARDSON's EQUITY 393 (S. C. 18 66)--executions
on firm property under separate and firm judgments, no issue on this
raised.
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firm property to separate debts are specifically dealt with in
Section 25 (2) (b), (c). The rights and remedies of an assignee
of a partner's interest in the partnership and of a judgment
creditor of a partner are specially declared in Sections 27 and
28. The South Carolina cases just discussed in which those
factual situations have occurred must presently, then, be
viewed in the light of these provisions, and consideration Will
be given them in the treatment of these Sections hereafter.
Conversion of Realty to Personalty. Section 26 declares
that "a partner's interest in the partnership is his share of
profits and surplus, and the same is personalty" (emphasis
supplied). It is clear that embraced in the interest is real
property; since there would be no point in declaring personal
property to be personal property. The provision is tantamount, therefore, to a declaration that partnership real property is converted into personal property. The inquiry then
arises as to the limits to which the conversion goes: whether
it is total or partial in extent.
Aside from the Act, there is general agreement that firm
real estate is converted, in equity, into personal estate; but
there has been sharp conflict between American and English
law with respect to whether the conversion is only pro tanto
for partnership purposes-with a resumption or retaining of
its original character as real estate thereafter-or whether the
conversion is complete for all purposes. The English view is
that the conversion is "out and out"-that is to say, for all
purposes, including descent and distribution, even after debts
are paid and partnership accounts settled: so that after the
settlement, the interest passes to the personal representative
74 0
and not to the heirs or devisees.
740. The leading English case is Darby v. Darby, 3 Drewry 495

(1856). The rule has been embodied in the English Partnership Act of
1890 (53-54 Victoria, ch. 39), § 22: "Where land or any heritable in-

terest therein has become partnership property, it shall, unless the
contrary intention appears, be treated as between the partners (including the representatives of a deceased partner) and also as between the

heirs of a deceased partner and his executors and administrators, as

personal or moveable and not real or heritable estate".
For discussion of the English rule, see MECHEn, PARTNERSHIP, § 163;
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 45; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed.), § 447;
4 POIEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed.), § 1166; note, 25 A. L. R.

389; 68 C. J.S. 512; 40 Am. Jur. 206.

See, also, Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 244.
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The prevailing American view has been that the conversion
is not complete, or "out and out," but as stated in the South
Carolina case of Schenk v. Lewis :741
In America, however, the rule is that to the extent that
partnership real estate may be required to pay partnership debts or to adjust equities between the partners in
the settlement of the partnership business, and only to
that extent is a trust implied, in enforcing which equity
treats the real estate as personal property and that when
these purposes are accomplished, whatever real estate
7
remains resumes its character as such.

42

In the South Carolina cases there is no dissent from the
rule of conversion, and for the purposes of the partnership
real property has been treated as personalty.7

43

If the real

estate was bought with partnership funds or for partnership
purposes, it is, under familiar rules, partnership property,
and the conversion takes place ;744 nor does the fact that title
may be held by only one, or less than all, of the partners alter
the rule.7 48 The conversion that takes place, under the South

Carolina cases, has been only pro tanto, as under the American
rule; hence, after the discharge of firm debts and the settle7 46
ment of accounts, the land resumes its former character.
The result, therefore, has been that once the land has been reconverted, dower attaches, 747 and the interest of a deceased
partner passes beneficially to his heirs or devisees instead of
7 48
to his personal representative.
741. Note 151, supra, at 244.

742. For discussion of the American rule and its qualifications, see

the authorities cited in note 740, supra.

743. Winslow v. Chiffeile, note 44, supra (discussed but not passed
on); Reed v. Kennedy, note 708, supra (mentioned in argument of counsel but not discussed by court) ; Boyce v. Coster, note 173, supra, at 30;
Bowman v. Bailey, note 706, supra, at 553; Wagner v. Sanders, note
183, supra,at 197; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
In Bowman v. Bailey, ante, it seems to be suggested that only for the
purpose of paying firm debts is the property treated as personalty, but
the other cases cited above, except the first two, make it plain that it
is for the adjustment of partnership equities as well.
744. Boyce v. Coster, note 173, supra, at 30; Bowman v. Bailey, note
706, supra, at 553.
745. Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra,at 245.
746. Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, supra, at 197; Bowman v. Bailey,
note 706, supra, at 553, 554 (at least after firm debts are paid); Schenk

v. Lewis, note 151, supra.

747. Bowman v. Bailey, note 706, supra; Wagner v. Sanders, note
183, supra; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra.
748. Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, supra, at 197; Schenk v. Lewis,
note 151, supra.
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Whether the South Carolina rule of partial conversion as
announced in the cases will continue depends upon whether
the conversion under Section 26 of the Act is treated as a
restatement of the American rule or an adoption of the English rule. On this subject the authorities are already showing
a lack of desired uniformity. Section 26 does not spell out a
rule of "out and out" conversion in the unmistakable terms
of the English Partnership Act;749 but, on the other hand, it
does not prescribe a qualification of reconversion or retention.
It should be noticed, also, that what is spoken of as personalty
in the Section is the partner's interest, and the interest is his
share of profits and surplus. The share of profits and surplus
is a remnant of assets after liquidation;and this is personalty.
What is left to the partner may include an interest in land.
It requires no strained construction to conclude that the Section declares a rule of "out and out" conversion.
Of the cases which have construed the Section as following
the English rule the most notable is Wharf v. Wharf,75° decided in Illinois. In giving as its reasons for that construction,
the court points not merely to Section 26, but to other portions
of the Act which round out a picture of total conversion. They
are: the disallowance of dower and similar interests under
Section 25 (2) (e) ; the vesting of title on the death of a partner in the survivor, and on his death in his legal representative-not his heirs-under Section 25 (2) (d) ; and the right
of a partner on dissolution to have partnership property applied to the discharge of firm liabilities and the surplus applied
to pay in cash the amount due to the partners-under Section
38 (1). There is no profusion of cases on either side and no
such great overbalancing of authority on one side or the other
as to call for a court's having to commit itself to a stated position for the sake of uniformity.751 The view which the South
749. See note 740, supra.

750. Note 726, supram
751. Cases which, in addition to Wharf v. Wharf, seem to adopt the
"out and out" rule: Hankey v. French, 281 Mich. 454, 275 N. W. 206
(1937); Swirsky v. Horwich, 382 Ill. 468, 47 N. E. 2d 452 (1943);
Harmon v. Martin, 395 Ill. 595, 71 N. E. 2d 74 (1947) ; Cultra v. Cultra,
188 Tenn. 506, 22 S. W. 2d 533 (1949)-the most emphatic of all;
Blodgett v. Silberman, 48 S. Ct. 410, 227 U. S. 1, 72 L. Ed. 749 (1928)
-- construing N. Y. enactment of U. P. A.; Zach v. Shulman, 213 Ark.
123, 210 S. W. 2d 124, 2 A. L. R. 1078 (1948); Mallin v. Schaper, 185
Fed. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 7, 11., 1950).
Cases which seem to adhere to the American rule: Webber v. Rosenberg, 318 Mass. 768, 64 S. E. 2d 98 (1945); Faust v. Heckler, 359 Pa.
19, 58 A. 2d 146 (1948); In re Perry's Estate, Mont. -,
192
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Carolina courts will take of the meaning of Section 26 remains, of course, for future determination and is not the subject of prediction. By the time a direct issue on the point
reaches the courts, there may be a considerably greater accumulation of interpretive cases to influence a decision.
While there is \a seeming conflict in the cases, the textwriters, on the whole, show an inclination to treat the Act as
adopting the rule of "out and out" conversion7 52 No Commissioners' note is attached to Section 26 to elaborate upon or
explain the import of the Section, and perhaps none was necessary; but if we may take the word of the draftsman of the
Act, the purpose of the Section was to adopt the English
53
rule
A choice of characterizations of a partner's interest under
the Act between conversion for all purposes and one for
limited purposes is not simply a matter of unmeaningful
terminology. In two respects the matter is of chief importance: devolution on death of the partner's interest, and taxation. If the conversion is "out and out," the real property
will pass to the personal representative and not to the heirs
or devisees. While in South Carolina the matter is of no great
consequence if the deceased partner was intestate-since the
heirs and distributees are the same-it is of considerable
moment if the partner died testate. The order of application of
assets to the payment of debts; abatement and ademption;
whether a gift of "personal property" would carry the complete interest in firm real estate; whether, conversely, a gift
of "real estate" would not carry it-all these are questions
which will hang upon the determination of the character of
the interest. From the viewpoint of taxation, if there is such
P. 2d 532 (1948)-case arising before U. P. A. adopted; Hannold v.
Hannold, 4 N. J. Super. 381, 67 A. 2d 352 (1948).
The word "seem" in the two preceding paragraphs is used advisedly,
since some of the cases are far from clear cut. There ar6 numerous other
cases in jurisdictions having the Act in which there is a recognition of
the conversion of the interest of a partner to personal property, but
they either do not mention the extent of the conversion or are so in-determinate upon the matter as to make it not worthwhile to cite them.
752. See TIFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d Ed.), § 444, n. 67; 4 PoMERoY's
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed.), § 1166; POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, §
139; WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION, 616;
CRANE & MAGRUDER, CASES ON PARTNERSHIP (Shorter Selection, 1930),
154, n. 10. The conclusions reached by some of these authorities are
based on Wharf v. Wharf. See, 32 YALE L. J. 845 (1923); 98 U. of PA.
L. R. 269 (1949); 21 TENN.L. R. 202 (1950).
753. 24 YALE L. J. 617, 637 (1915).
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conversion, the interest of a deceased partner would be considered an intangible personal asset, subject to an inheritance
or succession tax at his domicile, although the firm real estate
54
is elsewhere-i.e., in a state where conversion takes place.'
"Out and out" conversion in the state of the situs of the firm
real estate would be productive of a value on the intangible
asset different from that placed on it if the conversion was
only partial or not at all.
The working of a conversion, whether partial or total, does
not make the land itself anything other than land. A conveyance of the land, even for partnership purposes, could properly be made only by deed.7 r5 It would be a necessary assumption, also, that a judgment against a firm would on entry,
under South Carolina law, constitute a lien on firm real estate
as real estate; and that the property itself would be subject
7 56
to a property tax as real estate.
The substantive effect of the combination of treating a
partner's share as a right to participate in the surplus and
denominating it as personal property is to make the interest
a chose in action7 5 and to create in the partner a right to an
accounting.7 5s
Right to Possession of Firm Property. The provisions of
subsections (2) (a) and (2) (d) of Section 25, as they relate
to possession of partnership property, are self-evident propositions, when the overall nature of the partner's interests is
754. Blodgett v. Silberman, note 751, supra-firm real estate in New
York, deceased partner resident in Connecticut, interest taxable in Connecticut. In In re Perry's Estate, note 751, supra, the Montana court
treated as taxable the interest of a deceased partner domiciled in California in real estate located in Montana. The case, however, arose before
the U. P. A. was adopted in Montana.
Cf. Land Title & Trust Co. v. S. C. Tax Comm., 131 S. C. 192, 126
S. E. 189, 42 A. L. R. 432 (1924)-where a direction in a will of a testatrix domiciled in South Carolina to sell land in another state was held
to work a conversion of the land into personalty, the situs of which
would be in South Carolina and taxable in this state.
755. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP,

§

164; TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY

(3d

Ed.), § 447; 68 C. J. S. 513.
756. 68 C. J. S. 513.
757. Blodgett v. Silberman, note 751, supra; In re Dumarest's Estate,
262 N. Y. S. 450, 146 Misc. 442 (1933); McClennen v. Comm. Int. Rev.,
131 Fed. 2d 165 (C. C. A. 1, Mass., 1942); State v. Elsbury, 63 Nev.
463, 175 P. 2d 430, 169 A. L. R. 364 (1946).
758. In re Dumarest's Estate, note 757, supra; Clark v. Fiedler, 44
Cal. App. 2d 275, 113 P. 2d 275 (1941); State v. Elsbury, note 75T,
supra. Cf. the statement in the South Carolina case of Jones v. Smith,
note 176, supra, at 536: "The conveyance by one partner carries no more
than a right to account."
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considered-not merely under the Act, but before it. Whether
the ownership might have been treated as joint, with unity of
interest, or as in common, with fractioning of interests, the
possessory right of each partner has been, and is, equal and
not exclusive. No enlightening discussion appears in the South
Carolina cases on the point, but it is evident from the course
that possessory actions have been taken that the local principle
59
is fundamentally the same as that declared in the Act.7
The prescription in subsection (2) (d) that the survivor, or
the personal representative of the survivor, has no right to
possess firm property except for partnership purposes is
followed in the South Carolina cases, but the principle, for the
most part, is not stated negatively as the Act states it. Most
of the cases state affirmatively the right and duty of the survivor with respect to taking and holding firm property, but
in their stressing that such acts are for the purpose of administering the firm estate and in employing the term "trustee," there is necessarily the negative implication directed
against the use of firm property for other than partnership
00
purposes.
Assignment of Partner's Interest in Firm Property. Section
25(2) (b), which strikes down assignments of a partner's
right in specific partnership property, is a logical sequence
to the declaration, in subsection (2) (a), of each partner's
equal right to possession for partnership purposes. Theoreti759. See, in the discussion under Section 22, the topic of Possessory
Actions, and the cases there cited.
See, also, Boyd v. Munro, 32 S. C. 249, 252, 10 S. E. 963 (1889)"It was simply an admission that certain assets which W. J. Keenan
held, and, as one of the partners, had a right to hold (emphasis supplied), did not belong to him individually..."
760. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 559; Moffatt v.
Thomson, note 562, supra, at 160; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, sup'ra,
at 114: "The death of one dissolves the partnership, and the survivor
holds the property. He does not hold it, however, for his own use but
rather in the nature of a trustee, for the settlement of partnership debts
and the winding up of the concern;" Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra,
at 459; Boyd v. Munro, note 759, supra, at 253; Manship v. Newton,
note 550, supra, at 264; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra, at 242; Elliott
v. Flynn, note 499, supra, at 395.
In Moffatt v. Thomson, ante, a surviving partner who had liquidated
the firm's affairs was held to be violating his duty in retaining from
the administrator of the deceased partner the latter's share to satisfy
an individual debt. In Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, ante, a surviving partner was
held to be acting improperly in using firm funds to pay his individual
debt. Both these cases have been dealt with elsewhere-the first, under
Section 18, in the topic of Partner's Lien; the second, under Section 9,
in the topic Payment of Individual Debts with Firm Funds.
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cally, an assignee, becoming thus a part owner, would become
to that extent a partner. But partnership is the result of contract, and the assignee could not become a partner. He could
not, therefore, possess any part of the property, since the
possession would have to be for partnership purposes. Moreover, the share of a partner, as has been seen, is only the right
to participate in a residue. The transfer would at most be a
transfer of a part of that share, but what is that part? For
the partner's interest in specific property forms a part of a
mass of rights and duties, and to transfer only the interest
in a component fused into that mass is to undertake to transfer something incapable of reduction to any definite, calculable proportion. It is difficult enough to compute the share
of a partner in the partnership; to attempt to delimit the
partner's -share in specific property extracted from the whole
of the partnership compound is practically impossible-an attempt to separate the inseparable. Yet the law heretofore has
sanctioned such assignments, even though its eyes have been
open to their almost self-defeating character. Desired consistency within the Act, and the purpose to do away with the
unsolvable puzzle of what an assignee's interest in specific
property amounts to, are responsible for the fiat that a partner's interest is not assignable, except in connection with
assignment by the other partners-a collective, though not
necessarily a contemporaneous, assignment. (Of course, to
revert to a familiar theme, if there is the appearance of personal ownership, a bona fide purchaser would be protected.)
Accordingly, cases applying the subsection have declared the
assignment (including mortgage) by a partner of his interest in specific property nugatory. 76 1
The subsection under discussion has been held to have no
application to transfer by a partner of his interest in firm
property to the remaining partners. 762
Assignment of a partner's interest in the partnership is
not forbidden, and the effect of such an assignment is specially dealt with in Section 27. The assignment of a partner's
right in all the firm property is an assignment of a share in
761. Windom Nat. Bank v. Klein, 191 Minn. 447, 254 N. W. 602

(1934); Altman v. Altman, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 119, 271 App. Div. 884
(1946); Shapiro v. U. S., 83 Fed. Supp. 375 (D. C. Minn. 1949), aff.

178 Fed. 2d 459 (C. C. A. 8, 1949).

762. Stilgenbauer v. U. S., 115 Fed. 2d 283 (C. C. A. 9, Cal., 1940);
Becker v. Hercules Foundries, 33 N. Y. S. 2d, 263 App. Div. 991 (1942).
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specific property, but where such an assignment is capable
of being construed, under the circumstances, as an intended
transfer of the partner's share in the partnership, it will be
given effect as such, and controlled by the provisions of
Section 27.763
Attention has previously been given to the South Carolina
cases in which there has been subordination of the assignee
of a partner's interest in specific firm property to the rights
of firm creditors and the other partners. The main thesis in
these cases has been the secondary position of the transferees,
and not the effectiveness of the transfer as such, which is
sanctioned.7 04 So far as the analysis of the partner's share
is concerned, those cases are still sound precedent; so far as
they impliedly warrant separate transfers, they are no longer
so, by virtue of the prohibition of the Act. An assignee of a
partner's right in specific firm property will not hereafter
be merely deferred or allowed to take subject to outstanding
firm debts or equities; he will be excluded at the start.
Attachment and Execution. Section 25(2) (c) makes a
partner's right in firm property immune from execution and
attachment. This exemption is a necessary accompaniment of
-and actuated by the same principle as that concerned with
-voluntary assignment under subsection (2) (b). An execution or attachment furnishes the same objection to a third
person's intrusion as does a voluntary assignment, and in
fact-since ultimately it might lead to a subjection of the
interest to sale-may in some cases be treated as virtually
equivalent to an assignment.
Aside from the Act, there is general approval of execution
or attachment upon the partner's interest in firm property to
satisfy his duty, although, in order to accomplish the purpose,
seizure of or levy upon the firm property has been necessary.70 5 On sale, however, what is sold is not the whole prop763. Johnson v. Ellis, 49 Idaho 1, 285 P. 1015 (1930); Herman v.

Pepper, 311 Pa. 104, 166 A. 587 (1933). See POWELL,

REAL PROPERTY,

§ 139.

764. Viz: Boyce v. Coster, note 173, supra; Rose v. Izard, note 99,
supra; Brown v. Bradley, note 736, supra (these three cases are specially

noted in note 736, supra); Wilson v. Bowden, note 739, supra; Norris
v. Vernon, note 739, supra.
765. MTECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 148, 149; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 43;
68 C. J. S. 695, 696 (attachment), 738, 739 (execution); 40 Am. JUL
447 (execution); 4 Am. Jun. 764 (attachment). There is some difference
of opinion as to garnishment of funds due to a partnership on account
of demands against an individual partner. See note, 71 A. L. R. 77.
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erty, but the partner's share-which, as has been seen, as it
is involved in specific property, is practically incapable of
calculation. The Act puts an end to the confusion and contradictions arising from subjecting firm property to such
processes.
The South Carolina cases, while appreciating the difficulty
and clash of interests that execution or attachment under
these circumstances presents, nevertheless have permitted
seizure or levy to take place. In Schatzel v. Bolton,7 66 an attachment of partnership credits-debts owed by a third party
-by the creditor of some of the partners (all being nonresidents) was sustained, the court saying:
This [attachment of partnership property for individual
debt] has been too often practiced to be now questioned
as a general rule; and it is equally well settled that partnership property is liable to be taken in execution upon
a judgment obtained against one of the partners. ... In
the case of Hayden v. Hayden [a leading English case]
the court says, in such cases, the sheriff is to seize and
sell a moiety, and the vendee becomes tenant in common
with the other partner. In this respect the copartnership
property is like any other joint property.
It was further held here that the fact that there were partnership obligations would not prevent such seizure. The interests of firm creditors were recognized and protected by
the requirement of a bond, and in sequel cases it was held
that the funds of the partnership being money, only half
should be taken in attachment and that recourse could be had
by firm creditors upon the bond. 767 The same procedure of
seizure and security was followed, under similar facts, in
Knox v. Shepler,768 where the whole fund was seized. It was
there stated (at p. 596):
That the interest of one partner in the partnership effects may be taken in execution, or may be subject to
attachment at the suit of a separate creditor of that
partner, is not to be questioned, although there is some
766. Note 738, supra, at 480. The principle of this case was approved
in Wilson v. Bowden, note 739, supra, at 12.
767. Schatzel v. Bolton, (3 McCoRD), note 738, upra; Bowden v.
Schatzel, note 738, supra.
768. Note 563, supra.
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difference in the manner in which that interest shall be
made liable. The plaintiffs have a right to have the fund
paid over to them, but they can take it only as the absent
defendants had it, subject to the equities of the other
partners, and of creditors of the firm.
The cases just dealt with were all cases involving foreign
attachments, and the remarks on execution were therefore
dicta, except as they may have been used as a justifying
analogy; but there are cases, which have been previously discussed, in which the fact of execution of individual judgments
against firm property has been present. Here, again, the
stress has been upon the ultimate rights of the parties-the
relative position of firm and separate creditors-and not the
propriety of the execution and seizure, which is taken for
granted.7 00 The net effect of subsection (2) (c) is not to impugn the validity of the statements in these various cases as
to the nature of a partner's share in firm property; but, as
with assignments, the consideration of such matters cannot
arise again in connection with attempted executions and at77 0
tachments, since these are ineffectual from the beginning.
769. Viz: Crawford v. Baum, note 737, supra; Sniffer v. Sass, note
738, supra; Hooks v. Byrd, note 739, supra; Henderson v. Hadden, note
739, supra.
770. Subsection (2) (c) has been consistently applied to prevent execution or levy upon firm property on a claim against an individual partner: Sherwood v. Jackson, 121 Cal. App. 354, 8 P. 2d 943 (1932); Citizens Nat. Trust & Svgs. Bank v. McNeny, 10 Cal. App. 2d, 52 P. 2d
492 (1935); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ciminio, 108 N. J. L.
243, 157 A. 152 (1931); Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 133 Pa.
Super. 131, 2 A. 2d 553 (1938); Charleston First Nat. Bank v. White,
268 Ill. App. 414 (1932); Rader v. Goldoff, 228 N. Y. S. 453, 233 App.
Div. 455 (1928).
There is a difference in application with respect to foreign attachment: i. e., where the partner is a non-resident. Two Pennsylvania
cases have allowed such attachment. In Rankin v. Culver, 303 Pa. 401,
154 A. 701 (1931), attachment was permitted, the court stating that it
was not the partner's right in specific property which was the subject
of attachment and forbidden by subsection (2) (c), but the partner's
interest in the partnership.The writ was served on the resident partner,
who paid over to his copartner his share of the profits as they accrued;
for such payment the resident partner was held liable. In Luick v. Luick,
164 Pa. Super. 378, 64 A. 2d 860 (1949), the wife of a partner who
had left the state was permitted to attach the husband's share in the
firm after dissolution and apparent segregation of the share. In Townsend v. L. J. Appel Sons, Inc., 164 Md. 255, 164 A. 679 (1933), attachnient of a truck owned by a partnership to reach the interest of a nonresident partner was held improper.
In Rankin v. Culver, ante, the partnership business was conducted in
Pennsylvania and the writ issued there. The whole interest of the partner might be regarded as being in that place. If the firm did not do
business in the particular state, but instead had credits or funds in the
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It is to be remembered, however, in any event, that attachment or execution for firm obligations is specifically preserved: the process and the limitations have already been
dealt with in the discussion under Section 15. Since the subsection involved has as its purpose merely the change in the
law as related to seizure of firm property for separate obligations, it is not to be thought that the statement that execution and attachment will lie on claims against the firm is
intended to change the law with respect to the circumstances
under and the manner in which such seizures may take place.
For example, it is not the law of attachment or the law of
partnership that prevents the attachment of partnership property when one of the partners is a non-resident: it is the
presence of those statutes which make partnership property
available when all the partners are not served. It is submitted
that the rule laid down in Whitfield v. Hovey, 77°a discussed
under Section 15, is not changed. It is possible, however, that
where the liability is in tort-with joint and several liability
-the principle laid down in Campbell v. Hifll 7 °b (also discussed under Section 15) may have to undergo modification.
If one of the partners is a non-resident, and the asserted liability is in tort, there could be no joinder of him personally
as a joint tort-feasor, and resort against him would have to
be had severally. To acquire jurisdiction against him-or, to
be more precise, against his property-attachment would have
to be laid against the firm property; and, while the liability
may spring from a tort for which the members of the firm
are liable, the particular attachment would be one to satisfy
an individual liability arising from the several character of
the partner's responsibility. If that is the way one looks at
the matter, it might be argued that the subsection in question
would operate against attachment of firm property under
such circumstances; but this is argument merely and not
dogma or prediction.
hands of a third person, any attempted attachment would necessarily

be on specific property and not on the interest of the partner in the
partnership. All the South Carolina cases on attachment dealt with the
garnishing of debts owed to the partnership by resident debtors. Even

conceding the validity of the Pennsylvania cases-and a strong argument may be made against them-they would not apply to that kind of
situation.

770a. Note 372, supra; and see the text in which note 417, supra,
appears.
770b. Note 349, supra; and see the text in which note 419, supra, appears.
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It is not to be assumed that individual creditors, judgment
and otherwise, have no ultimate claims against partnership
property. Such creditors have a right to participate in firm
assets if, on a marshalling of firm and individual assets by
a court, there is something left for them after firm liabilities
are discharged; and these matters are dealt with in Section
40. Judgment creditors of an individual partner, deprived as
they are of the right to use execution, are nevertheless afforded a degree of protection by Section 28, which utilizes the
device of a charging order on the partner's whole interest to
enable the creditor to capture the partner's share of profits
coming to him from the partnership. This contrivance is borrowed from the English Partnership Act of 1890.77 1 For all
practical purposes, such an order is tantamount to a lien upon
the partner's interest in the partnership and can eventuate
in a forced sale of that interest. Extreme flexibility is accorded in the protection of the rights of the judgment creditor, but his right cannot arise above that of his debtor, and,
7 72
most important, his is a non-interfering right.
Homestead and Exemption Rights. Section 25 (2) (c) denies
to a partner, or to his representatives, homestead or exemption
in firm property as against attaching firm creditors. The
declaration is a restatement of the general rule.773 The South
Carolina rule is in accord, under Ex Parte Karish,7 74 and is.
based on the obvious proposition that until firm debts are paid.
the partner has no separate share which can constitute the
basis of an exemption. The partnership itself, of course, isnot entitled to an exemption against firm debts, the exemption
being allowable only to natural persons. 775 Certainly the South
Carolina statutes give no such privilege to partnerships as
such, and as much is to be implied from the result in Ex Parte
771. § 23(2).
7'72. But see Section 32(2) of the U. P. A., that dissolution may be
effected "on the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest
under Sections 27 and 28: (a) After the termination of the specified
term or particular undertaking, (b) At any time if the partnership was
a partnership at will or when a charging order was issued." The right
is given, it will be observed, not to the judgment creditor who has obtained a charging order, but to a purchaser of the debtor partner's
interest on a sale resulting from the utilization of the order.
773. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 316; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 44; 40
C. J. S. 528; note, 4 A. L. R. 300.
774. Note 734, supra-firm assets being insufficient to pay firm
debts, no exemption allowed to either partner.

775.

CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,

§

44.
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Karish. Nor is there any reason to suppose that on the death
of a partner, his wife and children, who are given homestead
against his debts,7 7 6 could assert the privilege in firm property against firm creditors.
As against separate creditors, a partner may assert an
exemption in his interest in the partnership, 7m although, as
has been seen, the determination of his ultimate share-which
might or might not be in excess of his exemption-would depend on the prior application to firm debts and equities. Section 28 (3) of the Act seemingly covers the situation in the
statement--"Nothing in this act shall be held to deprive a
partner of his right, if any, under the exemption laws, as regards his interest in the partnership."
Firm creditors are treated as are separate creditors with
respect to homestead and exemptions in individual property.
There seems to be no serious dispute that a partner has the
same right to applicable exemptions in his individual real and
personal property against his partnership creditors as he has
against his individual creditors. 7 7s No South Carolina cases
discuss the issue, but there are at least two in which the finding has been that homestead should be awarded in separate
property as against the claims of firm creditors. 779
Dower. Under Section 25 (2) (e) "A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy,
or allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin." Curtesy has
been nonexistent in South Carolina since 1883,70 and it is not
81
to be assumed that the Act is designed to re-establish it.7
Family allowances and allowances for a widow's support do
776. § 9088, S. C. CODE (1942).
777. Moyer v. Drummond, 32 S. C. 165 (1889)-in which it appeared

that the firm debts had been paid and the share left to the partner was
less than the exemptive amount.
If the partnership assets embrace real estate, the interesting question

arises whether the exemption is to b. treated as a homestead in real
property or as an exemption in personal property. § 9085, S. C. CODE
(1942), allows homestead of $1,000 in real estate to the head of a family;
§ 9090 gives him a personal property exemption of $500. If the debtor
is not married, he has an exemption of $300 limited to wearing apparel

and the tools and implements of trade. If conversion is "out and out"

and strictly applied, the head of a family would not be entitled to home-

stead and his right would be limited to the $500 personal property

exemption.
778. 40 C. J. S. 529; 22 Am. J. 90.

779. Wiesenfeld v. Stevens, 21 S. C. 126 (1883); Chalmers v. Turnip-

seed, note 295, supra.
780. 18 STAT. 339, now codified as § 8577, S. C. CODE (1942).

781. See the comment in note 126, supra.
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not exist (as they do in some other states by statute) in South
Carolina.78 2 Subsection (2) (e) has relevance, therefore, only
as to dower.
The status of dower in partnership property in South Carolina has had a varied experience. In the earliest of the reported cases in which the question appears, Richardson v.
WyatP8 (an action for partnership accounting), it was held
simply that the wife of a deceased partner was not entitled
to dower in partnership lands. The syllabus is more extensive
than the report in this respect, stating that "the widow of one
of the deceased copartners is not entitled to dower in the lands
and houses purchased with the copartnership funds, and held
in the names of all the copartners, or on their behalf." No
authority is cited, and it is not clear whether the conclusion
reached is a determination solely for the purposes of the case
or is a general statement of law; nor does it appear whether,
after paying debts and adjusting firm accounts, there was
anything left of the deceased partner's interest to which
dower might attach. In Reed v. Kennedy, 5 4 one of two partners, after dissolution, conveyed to the other his interest in
lands which had been bought with partnership funds and
transferred to the partners jointly. The grantor's wife did
not renounce dower. The land subsequently passed to the
defendant, and this action was brought by the widow of the
partner who had conveyed to the copartner. Although the
defendant's position was that the real estate was to be treated
as personalty, no discussion of it appears in the opinion. Instead, the court declared that the incident of survivorship
having been eliminated by statute from the joint tenancy, the
estate of each partner became a heritable one to which dower
would attach. No point was made of the position of firm debts
and equities in relation to dower, and none of those factual
problems appeared. The case, however, does assert positively
782. While the law does not make provision for family allowances as

a prior charge-ahead of creditors-upon a decedent's estate, in some
cases the personal representative will be allowed credit for expenditures
made for the family's support. See Darby v. Darby, 2 McCoRD's EQUITY
451 (S. C. 1827) ; Ordinary v. McClure, 1 BAMLY'S LAW 7 (S. C. 1828) ;
Hinton v. Kennedy, 3 S. C. 459 (1871); Graves v. Spoon, 18 S. C. 386,
391, 392 (1882). It is not to be assumed here, either, that the purpose
of the Act is to create charges or priorities for family allowances or
widow's support where none existed before. The comment in note 126,
supra, is also applicable here.
783. Note 120, supra.
784. Note 708, supra.
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the right of dower and was used afterwards as the basis of
the decision in Bowman v. Bailey.785 There, one of two partners sold to the other his interest in partnership land (held
in the names of both), with an understanding that the latter
was to sell it to the defendant. The selling partner did not
make a deed to his copartner, and both partners joined in a
deed to the defendant. The plaintiff, wife of the buying copartner, did not renounce dower. It was held that she was
entitled to dower in the one-half interest to which her husband had legal title. The court took notice of the conversion' to
personalty, but seemed to limit it to the extent of necessary
application to firm debts; and, since there was no showing
of firm debts, and as the contest was not between firm creditors and the wife, but between her and a purchaser, the court
declined to deal further with that phase of the problem. The
suggestion in this case is that only in favor of firm creditors
is dower postponed; and the case might stand for the proposition that the transfer of firm property by partners in the
course of business would be subject to unrenounced dowera proposition which is at odds with numerous cases elsewhere
which state that firm conveyances need not be joined in by
the wives of the partners. 7 8s
Later cases look upon dower in a light more in harmony
with the prevailing view based on pro tanto, or partial, conversion-that after payment of firm debts and adjustment of
firm equities, dower attaches. 7s7
The effect of the Act will be, of course, to change fundamentally the status of dower in partnership property. An
acceptance of the "out and out" view of conversion, if that is
the interpretation to be given to Section 26, would, naturally,
work the result of eliminating dower, initially and finally,
from firm real estate. But the express language of Section
785.,,Note 706, supra.

§ 45.
787. Wagner v. Sanders, note 183, supra, at 197; Schenk v. Lewis,
786. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 165; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,

note 151, supra-in which court ordered sale of deceased partner's in-

terest free of dower to survivors at appraised value of interest, and if
not bought by survivors then whole of firm real estate to be sold, free
of dower. The amount due the deceased partner's estate was held to
constitute a lien; this can be treated as another instance of the Partner's Lien, discussed in Section 18.
The matter of dower in partnership property has already been touched
upon, to some extent, in the discussion of the conversion of real property to personal.

On the whole subject of dower, see note, 25 A. L. R. 389, 411.
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25 (2) (e), without more, accomplishes that end. It is the right
of the partner in firm real estate which is. not subject to
dower; and the transfer of such an interest by one partner to
another, or their combined transfer to a third person, would
be free from any proper assertion of dower, which never attached at the outset. Moreover, the underpinning of dower
(as declared in Reed v. Kennedy, and followed in Bowman v.
Bailey-that there is no survivorship, but a severance creating a tenancy in common) is removed by the tenancy in
partnership, which, in Section 25 (2) (d), specifically puts the
deceased partner's right in the survivor. All in all, it can be
asserted with a fair amount of assurance that partnership
property, even after payment of firm debts and adjustment of
firm accounts, is not subject to dower. It is, however, possible that if there has been an inter vivos dissolution and the
partners have set aside to each other in severalty undivided
interests in firm real estate, the respective interests-being
no longer firm estate-would become amenable to dower.
If a partner owning real estate in severalty thereafter conveys it, or an interest in it, to the firm, dower would be paramount-not only to the rights of the other partners but to
firm creditors as well-since the right of dower had antecedently attached and no subsequent act of the husband part-

ner could affect

it.788

Assignment of Partner's Interest in Partnership. The assignment of a partner's interest in the partnership, as distinguished from assignment of his right in specific firm property, is not only not forbidden anywhere in the Act but is specifically recognized and controlled by Section 27. That interest, of course, is the share defined by Section 26. According to the Commissioners' note, the chief purpose of Section
27 is to effect a modification of the general rule that an assignment by a partner of his interest in the partnership,
whether to a third person or to his copartner or copartners,
causes dissolution.7 8 9 The effect, therefore, of the Section is
that such an assignment may not of itself and without
788. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 165; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 45; 17
Arn. Jur. 682; Chase v. Angell, 148 Mich. 1, 108 N. W. 1105, 118 Am. St.
Rep. 568 (1906); Shupe v. Rainey, 255 Pa. 432, 100 A. 138 (1917).
'789. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 364; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 78; 68
C. J. S. 852; 40 Am. Jur. 299; note, 69 Am. St. Rep. 416, 417.
The rule has not been so strictly applied when the transfer is by
way of security.
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more, work a dissolution, although it may furnish ground
to the other partners-if the assignment has been to a third
person or to some, but not all, the copartners-to compel
dissolution through court action. Since partnership is a voluntary relation, it is clear that a partner assigning to a third
person cannot, by his act, introduce a new partner into the
concern; and the Section sharpens that principle by denying
to the assignee the right to interfere in management or administration or to inspect the books.
What the assignee receives during the life of the partnership is only what his assignor would receive-profits, if any.
On dissolution he may receive the whole interest of his assignor, as prescribed in subsection (2). While he cannot,
ordinarily, bring about a dissolution and thereby accelerate
the receipt to himself of the assignor's full share, he may obtain dissolution-under Section 32(2)-if the partnership
was one at will, or if being for a definite term or particular
undertaking it had terminated or been accomplished.
Nothing in the South Carolina cases operates as a denial
of the principle that a partner may assign his interest in the
partnership; and it may be said that, with respect to the
validity of such an assignment, prior local law is in accord
with the Act.790 But, again, the transfer of the interest carries only the right to participate in the surplus after discharge of firm obligations and settlement of accounts; and
while, hereafter, a partner may transfer as effectively as he
did before and pass to his assignee his ultimate share, the
consequences are to be shaped by the provisions of Section 27.
South Carolina authority on the dissolving effect of an
assignment to a third person of a partner's interest in the
partnership is meager, but there is fairly clear inference in
at least two cases that such a transfer operates to dissolve
the partnership. 791 Authority with respect to a partner's
transfer to his copartners is slightly more plentiful, and the
790. Brown v. Smith, note 523, supra (which might, perhaps, be re-

garded more accurately as transfer of partner's interest in specific firm

property) ; Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 536. Some or all of the
cases in note 764, supra, might be regarded as intended transfers of a
partner's interest in the partnership.
See, also, Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra; Anderson v. Holmes, 14
S. C. 162 (1880).
791. Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra-partner sold interest in firm
to third person, who apparently succeeded seller in firm; Anderson v.
Holmes, note 790, supra-partner sold interest in firm to third person,
who formed new firm with other Dartners.
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rule seems to be that a transfer to copartners dissolves the
partnership7 91a In both types of cases, however, it appears
that no issue was made as to whether or not dissolution had
occurred, and that the transfers were regarded by the parties
as part of planned dissolution. To a certain extent, because
they fit into the discussion of dissolution as such, the effect
and significance of partners' transfers will be dealt with
again under the Causes of Dissolution.
PART VI.
DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP

SECTION 29. Dissolution Defined. The dissolution of a
partnership is the change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.
SECTION 30. Partnership Not Terminated by Dissolution. On dissolution the partnership is not terminated,
but continues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
SECTION 31.
caused:

Causes of Dissolution.

Dissolution is

(1) Without violation of the agreement between the
partners,
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular
undertaking specified in the agreement,
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite
term or particular undertaking is specified,
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not
assigned their interests or suffered them to be charged for
their separate debts, either before or after the termination
of any specified term or particular undertaking,
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business
bow fide in accordance with such a power conferred by
the agreement between the partners;
791a. DeGroot v. Darby, note 470, supra; Brown v. Chandler, 50
S. C. 385, 27 S. E. 868 (1897)-holding that agreement to sell at future
time does not immediately work dissolution; Huffman v. Huffman, note
65, supra.
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(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution
under any other provision of this section, by the express will
of any partner at any time;
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business
of the partnership to be carried on or for the members to
carry it on in partnership;
(4) By the death of any partner;
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership;
(6) By decree of court under section 32.
SECTION 32. Dissolution by Decree of Court. (1) On
application by or for a partner the court shall decree a
dissolution whenever:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial
proceeding or is shown to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of
performing his part of the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends
to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach
of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts
himself in matters relating to the partnership business that
it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried
on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest under sections 27 or 28:
(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular undertaking,
(b) At any time if the partnership was a partnership
at will when the interest was assigned or when the charging order was issued.
The four Sections set out above are bracketed because they
deal with the generating features of dissolution-what it is
and how it is brought about. These Sections serve the useful
purpose of dispelling a confusion that has always existed in
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the law-the identification of "dissolution" with "termination," and the inclusion of "winding up" in the one term or the
other. The Commissioners' note to Section 29 states that "In
this Act dissolution designates the point in time when the
partners cease to carry on the business together; termination
is the point in time when all the partnership affairs are
wound up; winding up, the process of settling partnership
affairs after dissolution."
It is quite clear, from the definition in Section 29, and the
express declaration in Section 30, that "dissolution" and "termination," however much they may seem alike, are not terms
that may be interchangeably employed and that they denote
different things. In the usual case there is the sequence: dissolution-produced by a given event; the intermediate period
of winding up; and finally the reaching of that point at the
conclusion of the winding up which marks the end of the
whole relationship. That is not always so, however; as-for
example-the partners, on a voluntary dissolution taking the
form of a sale by one partner of his interest to his copartner,
may have the dissolution accompanied or preceded by a settlement merged in, and forming the basis of, the dissolutionso that nothing may remain to be done and the partnership
affairs are completed.7

92

In other words, the winding up may

take place before, or at the time of, dissolution instead of
after. In such a case, dissolution and termination are contemporaneous.
While the matter may be one of nomenclature rather than
of consequence, incidents of diversity of terms and concepts
are to be found in the South Carolina cases. In Fisher v.
Tucker,7 3 it is said: "The contract of partnership is entirely
dissolved (emphasis supplied) by the death of one of the partners." The statement is made in Carrollv. Alston70 4 that "the
partnership terminated with the death of either party." In
Schenk v. Lewis, 70 5 dissolution and termination are used interchangeably, and the case speaks of death as usually working
an "immediate dissolution." In Sims v, Smith,790 which in792. See French v. Milholland, 218 Mich. 248, 187 N. W. 254, 21 A. L.
R. 1 (1922); MeNeny v. Touchstone, Cal. - , 54 P. 2d 1124
(1936).
793. Note 280, supra, at 171.
794. Note 120, supra, at 12.
795. Note 151, supra, at 241, 242.
796.

Note 78, supra, at 566.
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volved a partnership for a particular undertaking, it was declared that "upon the completion of their contract, or the
accomplishment of the entire business for which the partnership was formed, it eo instanti terminated." Dissolution has
been treated as a sort of continuing process; as in Kinsler v.
McCants, 97 where it is said that "a partnership is not completely dissolved until its affairs are closed." Elsewhere, and
coming closer to the principle stated in Section 30, it is stated,
in Duncan v. Westerund,795 that, after the death of a partner,
"the partnership continued in existence (emphasis supplied)
for the purpose of a final settlement. ' 7 9 It is obvious that the
usefulness of purpose that has already been described as
flowing from these Sections will work to clear up the conflict
of terms and ideas apparent in all these cases.
Causes of Dissolution. It may be stated as a generality
that, on the whole, the South Carolina cases treat as causes of
dissolution the situations set out in Section 31. The cases do
not, however, enumerate, as does the Section, all the situations
that may induce dissolution; but the total of the cases furnishes a compilation, so far as they go, of the determinants
of dissolution.
DISSOLUTION BY TERMINATION OF TERM OR UNDERTAKING.

The subject matter of this topic has largely been anticipated in the discussion, under Section 23, of Continuation
of Partnership Beyond Fixed Term. It bears repeating here
that the rule announced in Section 31 (1) (a), that dissolution
is caused "by the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement," is accepted in
799
the South Carolina cases.
Whether in a given case the partnership is for a fixed term
or particular undertaking on the one hand, or is of a different
797. Note 196, supra, at 47.
798. Note 565, supra, at 98.
798a. See, also, Jones v. Smith, note 176, supra, at 532, 534, indicating that the partnership continues until final settlement; Poole v. Gist,
note 233, at 261, supra, where, in dealing with liability of partners in
dissolved law firm, it is said "as between themselves, the partnership
was dissolved, but with respect to their engagement to the plaintiff
they could not dissolve it;" Meggett v. Finney, 4 STROBERT's LAW 220,
221 (S. C. 1850).-"the partnership is dissolved as to things future, but
as to things past it continues and must always continue;" Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra-to effect that partnership continues so
long as there are unpaid partnership obligations.
799. See the cases cited in note 696, supra.
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character-as at will-on the other, is a matter of factual
0 o the court,
interpretation. In Edwards v. Johnson,8
in construing the particular agreement on this point, declared: "As
there is no definite statement in the agreement as to the date
at which the partnership should determine, the term during
which it is to continue in existence is a matter of inference
from the nature of the engagement between the partners, the
contract provision and the facts and circumstances surrounding the parties; but if no such inference of an intention for
its continuance for some period can be so ascertained, then
the partnership agreement would necessarily be construed as
being determinable at the will of any one of the partners,
upon notice." If the agreement is for a term, the length of the
term may come into dispute, to be ascertained by the triers of
fact;801 but, as usual, a finding not sustained by the evidence
will not be upheld. 0 2 The determination of the extensiveness
of the undertaking, where the partnership is for the accomplishment of a particular object, is also a matter for factual
analysis, which, if the agreement is not represented by an unambiguous writing or is not otherwise free from doubt, presents, in a law case, an issue for the jury.8 08
DISSOLUTION BY WILL OF PARTNER-PARTNERSHIP AT WILL.

Subsection (1) (b) of Section 31 expresses the familiar rule
that where the partnership is not formed for a specific term
or undertaking, the partnership is at will and may be dissolved by any partner at any time, without liability to the
other partners. s0 The rule is followed in South Carolina.8 0 5
There is, however, in South Carolina and elsewhere, the requirement that to accomplish dissolution in this way, notice of
such intention must be given to the other partners. The condition is thus expressed in Edwards v. Johnson: 80 6 "While a
partnership at will is of course capable of being brought to an
end at the will of any partner, this result can only be accom800. Note 80, supra, at 95.
801. Brasfield v. Brown, note 662, supra; Edwards v. Johnson, note

80, supra.

802. Brasfield v. Brown, note 662, supra.
803. Sims v. Smith, note 212, supra.
804. MECHENT, PARTNERSHIP, § 351; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 74; 68
C. J.S. 843; 40 Am. Jur. 291.
805. Carroll v. Giles, note 119, supra; Edwards v. Johnson, note 80,
supra; McPherson v. Sirrine, note 538, supra.
806. Note 80, supra, at 97. The partnership was held not to have been
dissolved because notice had not been given.
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plished by a notice of such determination given by one partner
to all the others, and the partnership continues to exist until
such notice is actually given." While the subsection under discussion does not in terms prescribe notice, so much is implicit
in or inferred from the use of the prior adjective "express."8 0 7
DISSOLUTION BY MUTUAL CONSENT. In

31 (1) (c)

substance Section

is an affirmation of another familiar rule-that,

even though the partnership is one for a definite term or specific undertaking, all the partners may dissolve by mutual
consent.8 08 The same is, a fortiori, true of a partnership at

will. The South Carolina holdings are in accord. 80 9
The mode of manifesting the mutual consent is not pre-

scribed by law, and the evidence can be pieced together from
all the facts. 810 Although it is not necessary, the parties, in

their agreement of partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking, may provide for earlier dissolution by
consent.8 1 " Where the articles of partnership are under seal
and provide for dissolution under such circumstances, the dissolution, if it takes place, may be shown by parol and need

not be evidenced by a writing under seal, since the mutual act
is not an extinguishment of the covenant but a performance

of it.812

807. That such notice is necessary under the Act, see Bayer v. Bayer,
214 N. Y. S. 322, 215 App. Div. 454 (1926)-notice need not be formal;
Graham v. Street, 109 Utah 460, 166 P. 2d 524 (1946); Schneider v.
Newmark, 350 Mo. 955, 224 S. W. 2d 968 (1949).
808. MEcHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 450; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 374; 68
C. J. S. 846; 40 Am. Jur. 292.
809. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, mpra; White v. Union Ins. Co.,
note 307, supra, at 559.
810. Dickinson v. Bold, note 696, supra.
811. Truesdell v. Baker, 2 RICHARDSoN'S LAW 351 (S. C. 1846). See,
also, McPherson v. Sirrine, note 538, supra, where articles of partnership having many members provided any one of them might withdraw
at any time; the partnership here was not for a fixed term or undertaking. In Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra, the articles of
partnership, which was for a fixed term, provided that if at the end of
the first year the business was unprofitable either partner might terminate the partnership upon stated notice.
812. Truesdell v. Baker, note 811, supra. The court here had to contend with the ancient rule that covenants under seal can be dissolved
or altered only by agreements also under seal---"every contract ought
to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as that which first made
it obligatory." It is doubtful that the rule has any present vitality, for
it has more recently been held that a sealed instrument may be modified
by parol. Koth v. Bd. of Education, 141 S. C. 448, 140 S. E. 399, 55
A. L. R. 682 (1927). See, MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 359: "Even where
the partnership was created by written instrument, or by instrument
under seal, a dissolution by parol is usually held sufficient."
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The fiduciary relation persists between the partners in matters affecting dissolution; and if an agreement of dissolution
and settlement is based on calculations which are the result of
fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of full disclosure, the agreement may be set aside. In Badder v. Sleeby,813 it is said that
"the obligation of good faith is especially imperative, 'where
one partner is endeavoring to get rid of another, or to buy
him out;'" and "The necessity for good faith applies in the
case of a sale by one partner to another of his partnership
interest, and such sale will be sustained only when it is made
for a fair consideration and upon full disclosure of all important information and value." But from the same case it
appears that the agreement need not be set aside as a whole,
thereby restoring the partnership, but essential relief may be
granted by recasting the settlement and allowing the dissolution to stand.
The subsection under discussion, it is to be noted, allows
dissolution by the express will of those partners who have not
assigned their interests or suffered them to be charged for
their separate debts. It has previously been observed, under
Sections 27 and 28, that assignment of a partner's share, or
purchase of it under a charging order, will not of itself work
a dissolution. A partner who sold his interest to a third party
would almost certainly by this act be manifesting an intent
no longer to be a partner; and it would seem that the definition of dissolution in Section 29-"ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on" of the business-would fit the case. This
should be true, although a transfer of interest is not given
as a cause of dissolution in Section 31, unless such a transfer
could be said to fall within it as being a manifestation of a
will to dissolve either without violation or in contravention
of the partnership agreement. Nevertheless, Sections 27 and
28 prevent such an automatic dissolution; and whether the
partner who has voluntarily or involuntarily assigned his interest is regarded, under the circumstances, as still a member,
or the partnership as such is treated as continuing without
him, it is only the other partners who may bring about
through their concurrence a dissolution of the firm. The assigning partner no longer has power of action, nor does his
assignee, to bring about private dissolution, unless the others
813. Note 615, supra, at 107.
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are willing. Judicial dissolution alone is available to the assignee, under Section 32 (2) -where the partnership is at will
or the specific term has expired or the particular undertaking
has been accomplished. No right to go to court for the purpose
is given to the assigning partner.
The same expression of intention not to remain a partner
may be seen in the transfer by a partner of his interest in the
firm to his copartners. Such a transfer, except when made
as security, would, for all practical purposes, produce the
dissolution resulting from "ceasing to be associated in the
carrying on of the business." If the transfer is to a sole copartner or to all the other partners, as the case may be, the
act normally would denote the unanimous will of the partners
to dissolve. Yet, aside from the Act, it has been held that this
is not necessarily so, if there is no intent to bring the relationship to an end, and such an act may be regarded as merely
evidence of dissolution. 814 And it has been held that Section
27 of the Act applies against automatic dissolution where the
transfer is to all the remaining copartners, or to a sole copartner, rather to some of the partners. 814a A stronger case
against dissolution is made out where there is a transfer to
one or more but not to all the copartners. Section 27 would be
more readily operative in such a case; and the observations
on assignments to a third person would be appropriate in
that respect.
The South Carolina cases that offer instances of a partner's
sale of his interest to a third person,l 4b and of a sale to copartners814c have already been noted. In all of them the transfer has been treated as a dissolution, but it is fairly apparent
in each that the transfer, as between the selling partner and
the copartners, was intended to act as, or to be a part of an
agreement of, dissolution; and they are, for all major purposes, illustrations of dissolution by mutual consent.
DISSOLUTION BY EXPULSION OF PARTNER IN ACCORDANCE

WITH POWER. Section 31 (1) (d) deals with a situation that is
814. mECHE-Mi, PARTNEmSHIP, § 364; 68 C. J. S. 582; 40 Am. Jur. 299;
note, 69 Am. St. Rep. 417.
814a. First Nat. Trust & Svgs. Bank v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 213
Cal. 322, 2 P. 2d 341, 78 A. L. R. 1324 (1931). In Stilgenbauer v. U. S.,
note 762, supra,it is stated that a partnership is dissolved by a partner's
transfer of his interest to the remaining copartners, construction here
also being of the California Uniform Partnership Act.
0
814b. See the cases in note 791, supra.
814c. See the cases in note 791a, supra.
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comparatively infrequent. It is presented apparently in only
one South Carolina case, McPherson v. Sirrine,815 in which
the articles of partnership authorized the expulsion of any
member by the other members for any cause which they
deemed reasonable, and prescribed the settlement to be made
upon such a contingency. The plaintiff there sued alleging
wrongful expulsion-as for being unreasonable and without
cause. Because his action was predicated upon, and relief was
sought under, the contract provisions, he was held bound by
the stipulations affecting severance of the relationship as it
might occur. The action not being for damages for wrongful
expulsion, but for claimed rights under the contract, it was
held that no inquiry into the motives of the other partners in
expelling the plaintiff could be had. There is intimation-or
at least consideration of the possibility-that an action for
bad faith expulsion might lie, if properly brought, against
the other partners as individuals. Even so, the court seems to
treat the particular partnership as at will, saying (at p. 207) :
"The view of the situation above set forth is accentuated
when recourse is had to the fundamental fact that the partnership agreement does not fix any definite time for the termination of the partnership status, but leaves the time element to
be governed by contingencies such as the one that arose in
the present case. Under such circumstances, the partnership
is for all practical purposes a partnership at will, subject to
dissolution by the act of one or more of the partners at any
time."
There is no conflict, it is believed, between McPherson v.
Sirrine and the rule in the subsection. Both recognize the
propriety and effectiveness of a provision for ouster; and to
that extent pre-existing law falls into the Act. The necessity
of good faith, while not passed upon in the case because it
could not influence the decision, could, on common sense principles, be said nevertheless to be inherent in the older law.
An expulsion in bad faith would be ineffectual as expulsion
under the agreement of partnership, but it would nonetheless
be effective as a dissolution, on principle, because of the manifested will of the ousting partners. As a dissolution in contravention of the agreement, it would fall under Section
0

816. Note 538, supra,
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81 (2). The property rights of a partner bona fide expelled
from the firm are detailed in Section 38 (1).
DISSOLUTION IN CONTRAVENTION OF AGREEMENT. The Commissioners' note to Section 31 (2), which makes for dissolution
by express will of a partner even in contravention of agreement, states that its provisions are designed "to settle a matter on which at present considerable confusion and uncertainty exists. The paragraph as drawn allows a partner to
dissolve a partnership in contravention of the agreement between the partners. This is supported by the weight of authority. . . . The relation of partners is one of agency. The
agency is such a personal one that equity cannot enforce it
even where the agreement provides that the partnership shall
continue for a definite time. The power of any partner to
terminate the relation, even though in doing so he breaks a
contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized."
The weight of authority mentioned by the Commissioners
has, since the appending of the note, become even heavier.8 16
The result, of course, is that while a partner, because of his
contract, may not have the right to dissolve the partnership,
he has the power to do so. It has sometimes been said that no
partnership is indissoluble 8lT-which is something very much
like the truism that no will is irrevocable, even though to
revoke it would be in violation of contract.
There is no doubt that the pre-existing South Carolina view
is in accord with the weight of authority and within the rule
of the Act. In Price v. Middleton,81s approval is given to the
following language from probably the leading American case
on the particular subject, Karrick v. Hannaman:819

No partnership can efficiently and beneficially carry on
its business without the mutual confidence and co-opera-

tion of all the partners. Even when, by the partnership
articles they have covenanted with each other that the
816. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §§ 353-358; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 76;
68 C. J. S. 844; 40 Am. Jur. 292. The English view is different. MECHEM,
PARTNERSHIP, § 358; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 76.
817. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 355; 68 C. J. S. 842; 40 Am. Jur. 298.
In Atha v. Atha, 303 Mich. 611, 6 N. W. 2d 897 (1943), it is said that
"The right of a partner to dissolve is a right inseparably incident to
every partnership." As used here "right" is to be taken as meaning
19cpower Y
818. Note 10, supra, at 111.
819. 18 S. Ct. 135, 168 U. S. 328, 335, 42 L. Ed. 484, 489 (1897).
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partnership shall continue for a certain period, the partnership may be dissolved at any time, at the will of any
partner, so far as to put an end to the partnership relation and the authority of each partner to act for all;
but rendering the partner who breaks his covenant liable
to an action at law for damages, as in other cases of
breach of covenant.
In Price v. Middleton, the court, after determining that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants was
that of partners and not that of employee and employer, paraphrased the quoted language in its application to the case (at
p. 114) : "It is to be considered, too, that the law regards the
partnership dissolved by the expulsion of one member, only
because it is impossible to force the parties to continue in a
relation implying so much confidence." Dissolution by act in
breach of contract is further recognized in Welling v. Crosland, 820 in which it is said, concerning the effect upon liability to third persons of abandonment of an enterprise by
some of its members: "While, as between themselves, a member ... my withdraw, subject to accountability for damage
done ,to the others (emphasis supplied), he cannot, by withdrawing or abandonment, relieve himself from obligations
assumed while he was a member."
Although subsection (2) does not mention liability or the
consequences of wrongful dissolution, liability in damages is
specifically recognized and preserved in Section 38, as are
other consequences, rights and liabilities.
In Kinloch v. Hrmlin,8 21 a partner-the plaintiff's testator
-in a firm organized for a term of ten years, withdrew much
of his capital and otherwise failed to carry out his continuing
part of the bargain after three years. The defendant, the
other partner, continued to operate the business. A recovery
of profits made by the defendant after the other partner's
abandonment was denied to the plaintiff. It is not clear
whether the court treats the conduct of the violating partner
as a dissolution, although for all practical purposes it was so,
but this language from the case is relevant: ". . he has no
right to withdraw from the partnership. It is true, he has no
right to dissolve the partnership, so far as the rights of the
820. Note 74, supra, at 142.
821. Note 120, supra, at 19.
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defendant were concerned .... But surely it was competent
for him to abandon his interest in the concern, to forfeit his
share of the profits." It is to be noticed that the defendant was
not suing for wrongful breach, but the representative of the
wrongdoer was the suing party. There seems to be an inference here that even in the face of acts tantamount to dissolution, the innocent party may continue the business. In Section
38(1) (II) (b), the right is given to the partners who have
not wrongfully caused dissolution to continue the business
during the agreed term of the partnership, subject to prescribed safeguarding provisions.
DISSOLUTION BY SUPERVENING ILLEGALITY. Section 31(3),

dissolving a partnership by reason of subsequent events rendering the business unlawful, embodies a rule which is generally followed.82 2 The rule contemplates such situations as a
business becoming unlawful by reason of change in the law,
or a change in the personal status of a partner which would
render it unlawful for him to continue. No South Carolina
cases touch upon the issue of illegality arising after the formation of the partnership. The only case bearing a resemblance
to the problem is Belcher v. Conner,8 23 noted in the early pages
of this article in connection with the question of illegality in
the creation of a partnership. There, a partnership formed
to buy and sell slaves was dissolved by the death of one of
the partners in 1859, and an action for accounting, begun in
1860, and reaching appeal in 1867, terminated in favor of the
plaintiff in the face of a defense of illegality. Since dissolution had occurred by death before slavery became illegal, no
question could arise as to dissolution being caused by change
in the law.
DISSOLUTION BY DEATH OF PARTNER.

Section 31(4), de-

claring dissolution by death of a partner, states an ancient
principle of law. Whether the partnership is for a definite
term or particular undertaking, or at will, dissolution results
not only as between the deceased partner and his copartners
but as between the survivors as well.8 2 4 The rule has found
822.

MECHEAM, PARTNERSHIP,

C. J. S.854.

823. Note 40, supra.
824. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP,

C. J.S. 848; 40 Am. Jur. 326.

§ 370; CRANE,

§§ 361;

PARTNERSHIP,

CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,
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frequent approval and application in the South Carolina
8 25
cases.
It would seem, from the nature of things, that death wouldproduce dissolution immediately, without regard to subsequent events, prior agreements, or the nature of the partnership. Yet, in Schenk v. Lewiss 26 appears the following:
While it is true, as a general rule, that the death of a
partner effects an immediate dissolution of the partnership, it is not always so. If there was any special skill or
capacity in the deceased partner, the partnership would,
of course, cease to exist from the time of his death. But
if the business was for the purpose of keeping the dead
partner's capital invested in the business, there is no reason why his death would necessarily terminate the relation. 2 Story Eq. Jur. (14th Ed.), Sec. 916.27
This statement by the court was made in considering the
question of liability for profits made by the surviving partners who had continued the business instead of liquidating
it. The solution of this problem does not entirely depend upon
whether the partnership is regarded as dissolved at once or
afterwards. Too, the statement is largely dictum because of
the fact, as the court concedes, that the parties in the litigation had proceeded upon the theory that the firm had been
instantly dissolved. 2 8 There is, perhaps, some justification
even in the earlier South Carolina law for the view taken in
Schenk v. Lewis. In Carroll v. Alston,s29 the representative of
825. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra; Fisher v. Tucker, note
280, supra; Jones v. McMichael, note 47, supra; Carroll v. Alston, note
120, supra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra; Tompkins v. Tompkins,
note 550, supra; McBrayer v. Mills, 62 S. C. 36, 39 S. E. 788 (1901);
Schenk v. Lewis, note 151, supra; Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra. The
list is not exclusive, as there are many more cases involving the death
of a partner in which the fact of dissolution is taken for granted, although the term may not be used. The cited cases are merely those
which state the proposition.
826. Note 151, supra, at 241.
827. The quoted language is referred to, though not necessarily with
approval,-and differentiated from an inter vivos dissolution-in Karres
v. Pappas, note 578, supra.
828. Professor Crane, in his work on Partnership (§ 77, n. 39), comments that "in Schenk v. Lewis * * * it is suggested, as a dictum, that
dissolution would not necessarily follow the death of a partner who
was not expected to furnish any services. It is submitted that this
should not be true, unless there is not only concentration of management
in elected representatives, but in transferability of shares, as in a
joint-stock company."
829. Note 120, supra.
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a deceased partner in a firm to which the partners contributed
skill and services as well as property was denied participation
in profits made by the survivor. The reason was given (at
p. 12) :
The partnership terminated at the death of either
party. Can the right to net profits survive that event?
The consideration of the agreement, in the present case,
was the mutual skill and services of the partners, for the
profits of the business did not depend upon capital, but
upon skilled labor, and, accordingly, ceased with the death
of either of the copartners.... It would be virtually declaring as the intent of the parties, that, in the event of
the death of one of the parties, his interest should continue for the benefit of his representatives, free from
the necessity of either contributing to the common interest or liability for its losses.
There may be here a reverse inference of suspended dissolution under different circumstances; but whatever the force
of these two cases might have been as stating, by direction or
indirection, that death does not in such instances dissolve the
partnership, the Act now deprives them of vitality in these
respects. In addition to the flat declaration in the subsection
that death dissolves the partnership the definition in Section
29 makes the result inevitably so-since a dead partner is the
obvious one who ceases to be associated in the carrying on of
the business.88 0
Difficulty has arisen in some of the cases where there have
been special agreements that the partnership shall continue
after a partner's death, or other agreements designed to have
the same effect. In some of the jurisdictions in which the Act
is in force, there are statements to the effect that death will
cause dissolution in the absence of special agreement-or,
negatively, that dissolution will not take place if there is a
special agreement to the contrary. 88 1 On the other hand, many
830. In Zeibach v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 82 P. 2d 375 (1938), the
court, without adverting to the Act, in force in the state, held that
where a partner had a small investment in the firm and took no active
part, the firm was not dissolved upon his death. The authority cited in
support is Schenk v. Lewis. No other case in a U. P. A. jurisdiction
makes a similar assertion.
831. Underdown v. Underdown, 279 Pa. St. 482, 124 A. 159 (1924);
Gerding v. Baier, 143 Md. 520, 122 A. 675 (1924).
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other cases treat the dissolution as automatic, although binding force in the agreement may be permitted.8 3 2 The problem,
outside of South Carolina, is not new. Agreements which are
designed to prevent the disruption of a business and to insure
or allow its continuity take various forms: the partners may
agree that the business shall be continued after the death of
one; it may be agreed that the capital of a deceased partner
shall remain in the firm; it may be provided that the survivor
shall purchase, or have the option to purchase, the interest of
the deceased partner. Or a partner may provide in his will
that his executor or a legatee shall take his place in the business. All such arrangements may be given effect, but the
holding has generally been, nevertheless, that the firm is dissolved by death. If there is more than one survivor continuing
the business, or if the representative or legatee of the deceased
partner, by virtue of testamentary sanction or original agreement, joins with the survivor as a participant in the business,
a new firm is formed.sssa What happens is that the business
continues and not the old firm-except as it is kept alive for
purposes of settlement.83 3
832. Benedict v. Price, 38 Fed. 2d 309 (D. C., N. Y., 1929)-agreement that business be carried on and profits paid to estate of deceased
partner; Wolbach v. Commr. Corpns., 268 Mass. 367, 167 N. E. 677
(1929)-agreement to continue business; Darcy v. Commr. Int. Rev.,
66 Fed. 2d 581 (C. C. A. 2, N. Y., 1933)-agreement providing that in
computing share of partner income between time of partner's death
and end of business year should be included, court stating: "That agreedid not, and could not keep the partnership in existence
ment *'
Cal. App. -,
with a dead man as partner;" Abel v. O'Hearn, 218 P. 2d 827 (1950)-agreement to continue business.
832a. The bequest by a testator of his interest in a partnership does
not make the legatee a partner with the survivor, unless the survivor
and the legatee enter into a contract of partnership. Nor does the payment of profits to the legatee in consideration of the sale of the interest.
Dulany v. Elford, note 57, supra; Dulany v. Elford, note 105, supra.
See the discussion under Section 7(3) (c).
833. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP,

§

361; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,

§§

73, 77-

"Where courts have said that the rule may be varied by agreement,
what is meant is that in such cases, the dissolution is not followed immediately by the usual consequences of dissolution, i. e., winding up the
business."
See, also, FULLER, PartnershipAgreements for Continuation of Enterprise After Death of Partner,50 YALE L. J. 202 (1940); 40 Am. Jur.
327; note, 73 A. L. R. 983.
Continuance of the business is specially dealt with in Sections 41 and
42 of the Act, which is a fair recognition by implication of the propriety
of such arrangements. Where such agreements are made, the Act is said
to control the liquidation of the partnership. In re Eddy's Estate, 26
N. Y. S. 2d 115, 175 Misc. 1011 (1941); Wood v. Gunther, 89 Cal. App.
2d 718, 201 P. 2d 874 (1949).
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Under the Act it is difficult to see, whatever may be the
practical effect of special agreements, how dissolution-as
distinguished from winding up and termination-can be prevented by such agreements. There is not, as there is on other
points elsewhere in the Act, a qualification that the result
shall be subject to, or altered by, agreement. 834 Strangely,
agreements designed to keep a business going, while they are
actually fairly common in South Carolina, do not seem to have
gotten into the cases, and judicial contact with them is yet to
be established-at least, so far as their effect is concerned ss5
DISSOLUTION BY BANKRUPTCY OF PARTNER OR PARTNERSHIP.

Section 31(5) is a restatement of the well-established rule
that bankruptcy of any partner or of the firm produces dissolution.8 30 Authority in South Carolina, while scarce, is in accord-at least as to the adjudication of the bankruptcy of a
partner s37
OTHER CAUSES AND FEATURES OF DISSOLUTION.

Section 31

does not embrace all the causes of dissolution as they are
usually regarded as existing at common law. Nor does any
other Section furnish a supplement of causes, other than Section 32 which enumerates the grounds for dissolution by judicial decree. It has already been noted that the sale of a partner's interest to a third person or to some or all of his copartners is not a prescribed cause of dissolution, although the
circumstances might indicate the sale was an expression of a
will to dissolve. The sale or transfer by the firm of all the
834. The North Carolina version of the Uniform Partnership Act has
an amendatory provision to subsection (4): "unless the partnership
agreement provides otherwise." G. S. §§ 59-61.
835. In McPherson v. Sirrine, note 538, supra, provisions for various
contingencies, including death of a partner, appear in the articles of
partnership-that on the voluntary or involuntary withdrawal of a partner, or upon his death, his interest in the firm as such should not continue, and payment to him or his estate to be made dependent upon the
circumstances of his severance from the firm; and a special recital that
"the intent of the agreement is to insure the name and continuance of
the organization." The break in association in this case was not caused
by death.
In Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra, it was provided that upon
the death of one partner, the survivor should have the option of purchasing the decedent's interest. Dissolution was not caused by death.
836. M CHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 362; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 77; 68
C. J. S. 840; 40 Am. Jur. 305.
837. Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra. There are other cases in which
the fact or allegation of the bankruptcy of a partner appears, but no
treatment is given of the dissolving effect of the bankruptcy. Peizer
Mnfg. Co. v. Pitts, note 185, supra; Wright v. Hodges, note 389, supra.
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firm property is not given in the Act as a cause of dissolution,
but aside from the Act, such a disposition is generally regarded as bringing it about.83 8 For all practical purposes,
however, such concerted action might be regarded as dissolution upon the termination of a particular undertaking or by
mutual consent; and the event would thus fit into the Act.
Little mention is made in the South Carolina cases of disposal
of the entire assets of a firm as dissolution, but it is intimated in one case that it is not. In Metz v. Commercial
Bank, 8 0 it is stated that "to part with a part of the partnership property does not destroy it [the partnership]. Indeed,
to sell all the property will not do so, for more may be bought,
or a change of some kind may be made." While this may be
true, it ought to be admitted that the attendant circumstances
may indicate the contrary, and one may readily suppose that
such a complete disposal of firm property was intended, nothing else appearing, as a closing out not only of business but
of the firm as well. That such an event may realistically be
looked upon as dissolution is to be seen in another South Carolina case, McBrayer v. Mills, 40 which involved a partnership
accounting, where it was said that (at p. 42) "[the partner]
died in December, 1891, and this worked a dissolution of the
partnership, even if the partnership was not practically dissolved in January, 1884, when [the firm] sold out their stock
and ceased to do business."
It has frequently been stated that any change in the personnel of a firm works a dissolution. 41 Hence, to begin with, the
retirement or withdrawal of a member from the firm has that
effect. It was so before the Act, and since the Act it is equally
so, as it falls within the defining character of a partner's
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on of the business,
under Section 29.41a Retirement or withdrawal of a partner
may be based on mutual consent, exercise of the power where
the partnership is at will, or even in violation of agreement;
in all such cases the disappearance of the partner from the
838.

MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, §

372; CRANE,

PARTNERsHIP,

§

74; 68

C. J. S. 851; 40 Am. Jur. 299; note, 69 Am. St. Rep. 416.
839. Note 15, supra, at 246.
840. Note 825, supra.
841. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 88; 68 C. J. S. 853; 40 Am. Jur. 298.
841a. Laudeman v. Beyler, 34 Ill. App. 16, 57 N. E. 2d 518 (1944);
Egner v. State Realty Co., 222 Minn. 305, 27 N. W. 2d 464, 170 A. L. R.
500 (1947).
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firm is a dissolution under the Act, even though the word "retirement" or "withdrawal" may not be used. Normally the
words indicate facts suggestive of mutual consent, and the
usual "retirement" or "withdrawal" is accompanied by, or
results from, a partner's selling his interest to his copartners,
who may or may not assume firm debts. The South Carolina
cases in which there has been retirement and sale of interest
to the copartners, with dissolution accepted as a fact, are too
numerous, and not sufficiently important, for citation. It
seems to be taken for granted, in any event, that retirement
4
or withdrawal, as such, is a cause of dissolution. 1b
Although the Act does not in terms make change in personnel a cause of dissolution, the general declaration has been
made in some cases involving partnership law in states where
the Act is in force that a change in firm composition works
842
a dissolution.
If change in personnel produces dissolution, not only would
retirement or withdrawal accomplish it but the admission of
a new member into an existing firm would bring it about as
well; and so, outside of the Act, is the general rule. 43 The
definition in Section 29-built around a severance of association-would seem to rule out admission of a member alone as
a suitable determinant of dissolution. Moreover, the entry of
a new member is not mentioned in Section 31 as one of the
causes of dissolution. Nevertheless, there appears in some of
the cases from jurisdictions having the Act the statement
that dissolution is effected by admission of a new member. 84 '
But the language of the Act is declared elsewhere as changing
the law. In Helvering v. Archbold,8 4 r a tax case, in which the
New York Uniform Partnership Act was considered, it was
declared that "whatever was the rule at common law, the
entrance of a new partner with the consent of all the old partners is not now a cause of dissolution under the Partnership
Law of New York." Cited is the section of the New York laws
841b. See Hart v. Finney, note 261, supra; Karres v. Pappas, note
578, supra.
842. Security State Bank v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 332, 214 N. W. 151
(1927); Comm. Int. Rev. v. Shapiro, 125 Fed. 2d 532, 144 A. L. R. 349
(C. C. A. 6, 1942)-involving Tennessee law.
843. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 372; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 88; 68

C. J. S. 853; 40 Am. Jur. 298.
844. Ellingson v. Walsh, 15 Cal. 2d 673, 104 P. 2d 507 (1940); Comm.
Int. Rev. v. Shapiro, note 842, supra.
845. 70 Fed. 2d 720 (C. C. A. 2, N. Y., 1934), cert. den. 55 S. Ct. 109,
293 U. S. 594, 79 L. Ed. 688.
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corresponding to Section 31 of the Act. But hard on the heels
of this statement is another one by the court that there is in
such cases a de facto dissolution. In this concession there is
considerable substance, for, dissolution or not under the Act,
the firm with the new member is not the same as the firm
with the old ones; and it is hardly to be assumed that two
firms exist under such circumstances.
The Act deals with incoming members in several
places. To
Section 17, which deals with the liability of an incoming
partner, the Commissioners' note remarks that when a new
partner is admitted to a firm without liquidation "the present
theory of the common law is that a new partnership is
formed." Nothing in the remainder of the note indicates a
purpose to change the law in this respect: the design is to
declare the rights of creditors in such an event. In dealing
further with the rights of creditors where a new partner is
admitted into a firm which does not liquidate following the
admission, the Commissioners' note to Section 41(1) states
that "It is universally admitted that any change in membership dissolves a partnership, and creates a new partnership.
The section as drafted does not alter that rule (emphasis supplied)." In his comment on Section 41, the draftsman puts
this case: "A, B and C are partners. E et al. are their creditors. Without any notice to E et al., or any settlement with
them, D is admitted as a partner in the business. At the common law, as under the proposed Act (emphasis supplied), the
admission of D dissolves the first partnership and creates a
8 46 If it were
second partnership, composed of A, B, C and D."1
not for such distinguished authority as Helvering v. Archbold, one might rationalize-with a kind of pressured logicthat the definition of dissolution in Section 29 is met in that
the members of the old firm have ceased to be associated in
the carrying on of the business of the old firm, and that by
admitting a new member they have expressed their will to
dissolve the old firm, thereby fitting the case into Section 31.
In aid of this conclusion the comments of the Commissioners
and of the draftsman might, of course, be hauled into supporting position.
So far as pre-existing South Carolina law is concerned, authority is scant, but the proposition that admission of a new
846. 24 YALE L. J.617, 635.
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partner into the firm causes dissolution seems to be ac,
cepted. 847 Its continuance or discard as law depends upon the
interpretation to be given the Act in that respect.
Whether in a given case the partners have by their acts
8
dissolved their partnership is a question of fact.

48

DISSOLUTION BY JuDiCIAL DECREE. Section 31 (6) and Sec-

tion 32 are essential recognition of the elemental rule that
dissolution may be effected by a decree of court. So far as
South Carolina law is concerned, the number of cases in which
dissolution has been sought or effected is sufficient to disclose
the existence of the power of a court of equity to decree dissolution, although they disclose no controversy as to the inherent jurisdiction of the court for the purpose.849 When the
partnership is at will, there is little or no need for asking a
court to do what the complainant could himself bring about,
but such an action has been maintained.85 0 And, under the
Act, it has been held that a partnership at will may be dissolved through judicial proceedings. 51
Section 32 is valuable from an overall point of view because
it distinguishes the grounds for dissolution by judicial action
from the causes of dissolution. The events which may furnish
the grounds for dissolution are not events which themselves,
and automatically, produce it. Further value is afforded by
the enumeration of grounds and the addition of the catch-al
provision in subsection (1) (f). The importance locally of the
Section-in addition to the useful features just mentionedis that it supplies a standard for dissolution by judicial decree
where none existed before. In some of the cases no reasons
847. Roach v. Ivey, note 652, supra.
848. Martin v. Walton, 1' McCoRD's LAW 16 (S. C. 1821); Hammond
v. Aiken, note 243, supra; Brown v. Chandler, note 791a, supra; Simmel
v. Wilson, 121 S. C. 358, 113 S. E. 487 (1922).
849. The following are cases in which dissolution has been sought or
decreed: Jones v. Webb, note 682, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, note 24,
supra; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529, supra; Lyles v. Williams, note 679,
supra; Pendarvis v. Berry, note 39, supra; Heretis v. Taggs, note 61,
supra. This list is probably not exclusive.
850. See Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra. The action was not only
for dissolution but accounting. In some of the cases cited in note 849,
supra,it does not appear whether the particular partnership was at will
or for a term or undertaking.
851. Lacey v. Ritter, 458 Pa. 502, 57 A. 2d 679 (1948). But see, apparently contra, Gerstein v. Teitelbaum, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 502, 273 App.
Div. 886 (1948). In any event, it would seem that under Section 32
dissolution would not be ordered merely because the complainant desired
it-since the Section prescribes the grounds on which relief is to be
granted.
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are given why the relief is sought, or, at least, they do not
appear.8 52 In others, there are allegations of mismanagement,
misappropriation, or neglect, 85 3 grounds which would now
fall within subsections (1) (b) and (1) (c)-a partner's misconduct.8 5 4 Nowhere, however, does there appear a recital or
detailing of the circumstances under which a court of equity
will decree dissolution; but the cataloguing of grounds by the
Act will make it possible hereafter for a court to condition
its action.
SECTION 33. General Effect of Dissolution on Authority
of Partner. Except so far as may be necessary to wind
up partnership affairs or to complete transactions begun
but not then finished, dissolution terminates all authority
of any partner to act for the partnership,
(1) With respect to the partners,
(a) When the dissolution is not by the act, bankruptcy or death of a partner; or
(b) When the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy
or death of a partner, in cases where Section 34 so requires.
(2) With respect to persons not partners, as declared
in Section 35.
SECTION 34. Right of Partner to Contribution From
Copartners After Dissolution. Where the dissolution is
caused by the act, death or bankruptcy of a partner, each
partner is liable to his copartners for his share of any
liability created by any partner acting for the partnership as if the partnership had not been dissolved unless
(a) The dissolution being by act of any partner, the
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge of the
dissolution, or
(b) The dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy
of a partner, the partner acting for the partnership had
knowledge or notice of the death or bankruptcy.
852. Wilson v. Wilson, note 24, supra; Kennedy v. Hill, note 529,
supra-but there was a showing of irreconcilable differences; Pendarvis
v. Berry, note 39, supra.
853. Jones v. Webb, note 682, supra; Lyles v. Williams, note 679,
supra; Heretis v. Taggs, note 61, supra.
854. As to misconduct by partner or dissension among partners as
grounds for dissolution, see note, 118 A. L. R. 1421.
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SECTION 35. Power of Partner to Bind Partnership to
Third Persons After Dissolution. (1) After dissolution
a partner can bind the partnership except as provided in
Paragraph (3)
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolution;
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership if dissolution had not taken place, provided the other
party to the transaction
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution; or
(II) Though he had not so extended credit, had
nevertheless known of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or notice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in
a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in
each place if more than one) at which the partnership
business was regularly carried on.
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (ib)
shall be satisfied out of partnership assets alone when
such partner had been prior to dissolution,
(a) Unknown as a partner to the person with whom
the contract is made; and
(b) So far unknown and inactive in partnership
affairs that the business reputation of the partnership
could not be said to have been in any degree due to his
connection with it.
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of
a partner after dissolution
(a) Where the partnership is dissolved because it is
unlawful to carry on the business, unless the act is
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs; or
(b) Where the partner has become bankrupt; or
(c) Where the partner has no authority to wind up
partnership affairs; except by a transaction with one
who
(I) Had extended credit to the partnership prior
to dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of his
want of authority; or
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(II) Had not extended credit to the partnership
prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or
notice of his want of authority, the fact of his want
of authority has not been advertised in the manner
provided for advertising the fact of dissolution in
paragraph (IblI).
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability
under Section 16 of any person who after dissolution represents himself or consents to another representing him
as a partner in a partnership engaged in carrying on
business.
The three Sections above are grouped because they relate
to the essentials of the authority of partners as affected by
dissolution.
Effect on Authority Generally. The central principle in
Section 33 and the negative implications of Section 35 are
that the dissolution of a partnership terminates the authority
of a partner to bind the partnership. The exception is as to
those acts relating to the completion of unfinished transactions and to the winding up of the affairs of the partnership.
The rule of terminated authority declared in the Act is a restatement of the general rule. 5 i
The doctrine affirmed in the Act is abundantly supported
by local decisions. The principle as it runs through the South
Carolina cases is variously expressed. It is said that upon dissolution the mutual agency of the partners ceases ;856 that a
partner no longer has the power to bind the others ;857 and,
most frequently, that a partner cannot bind the partnership
by any new or original obligations or contracts. 58 s Of course,
as with the agency when the partnership is in existence, actual
or express authority may supply the power to act where none
855.

MEOHEN,

PARTNERSHIP,

§§ 423-425;

CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 80;

68 C. J. S. 862; 40 Am. Jur. 318.
856. Myers v. Huggins, 1 STROBHART'S LAW 473, 477 (S. C. 1847).
857. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra, at 43; Lamb v. Singleton, 2
BREVARD'S LAW 490 (S. C. 1811) -

reporter's note; Chardon v. Oliphant,

3 BREVARD'S LAw 183, 2 TRUADWAY'S REP. 685, 6 Am. Dec. 572 (S. C.
1815); White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 561; Fisher v.
Tucker, note 280, supra, at 170; Poole v. Gist, note 233, supra, at 260.
858. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, at 560; Union Bank v.

Hall, HARPER'S LAW 245, 250 (S. C. 1824); Veale v. Hassan, 3 MCCORD'S
LAW 278, 279 (S. C. 1825); Kendrick v. Campbell, 1 BAILEY'S LAW 522,
526 (S. C. 1839) ; Steele v. Jennings, 1 M ULLAN'S LAW 297, 298 (S. C.
1841); Tompkins v. Tompkins, note 550, supra, at 21, 22.
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exists by implication.8 5 9 Whether express authority has been
conferred is a question of fact. 0° If such authority has been
given, it need not be manifested in any particular mode, and
no writing is necessary 1s Although no South Carolina cases
touch the point, it is clear that, as in other cases of unau-

thorized acts, ratification may validate an unauthorized act
8
of a partner after dissolution.

62

Authority in Winding Up. The declaration in Section 33
by way of exception, and the positive statement in Section

35 (1) (a) that authority exists in the partners to bind the
partnership by acts necessary or appropriate for winding up

firm affairs and completing unfinished transactions, are an
embodiment of the general rule.

63

In both respects does this

represent South Carolina law-the power to bind with respect
to uncompleted transactions, 64 and the power to perform undertakings connected with winding up.8 65 The corollary is
that if the act is not necessary or appropriate for winding
up or is not for the purpose of completing a binding transac859. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra; Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, 1
MCCORD's LAw 388 (S. C. 1821); Loomis v. Pearson, note 313, supra;
Galliott ads. Bank, 1 MCMuinA"'s LAw 209, 36 Am. Dec. 256 (S. C.
1841); DeGroot v. Darby, note 470, supra, at 122; Heckheimer v. Allen,
89 S.C. 453, 71 S. E. 1033 (1911).
860. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra; Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys,
note 859, supra; Myers v. Huggins, note 856, mspra.
861. Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra.
862. 68 C. J.S. 869; 40 Am. Jur. 322.
863. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP,

§

423; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP,

§

80; 68

C. J. S. 863; 40 Am. Jur. 318.
864. Poole v. Gist, note 233, supra; Kendrick v. Campbell, note 858,
supra; Meggett v. Finney, note 798, supra; Tompkins v. Tompkins, note
550, supra.
865. The principle appears in the cases not so much in the form of
positive statement as it does by inference. See Kinsler v. McCants, note
196, supra, at 47: "After dissolution inter ivos, the joint interest of the
partners continues in the partnership property; and the mutual agency
is prolonged * * until the affairs of the partnership are administered."
See, also, Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra - to effect that
agreement to wind up business authorized acts creating liability in connection therewith.
The matter arises indirectly in cases in which a surviving partner
seeks to charge or asks credit for expenses incurred in winding up the
business. In Tompkins v. Tompkins, note 550, supra, and Schenk v.
Lewis, note 151, supra,it is made clear that expenses incurred in liquidation and for the preservation of the property are proper items chargeable to the estate of the deceased partner in an accounting between the
survivor and the deceased partner's representatives. If third persons
furnished services or goods for purposes incident to the winding up,
they would have realizable claims against the estate of the deceased
partner; although liability might be enforced only indirectly against
the estate, since the contracts would have been made only with the sur-
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tion, liability against the other partner or his estate cannot
be created. 860
The usual rules of agency which apply when the firm is a
going concern apply after dissolution; so that when a partner
acting within the scope of his authority after dissolution is
serving his private purpose or misapplies funds properly received, his copartners are bound, in the absence of knowledge
of the intended misapplication;867 otherwise, when such intention is known. 868
Liquidating Partner. Section 37 of the Act declares, in substance, that all the partners have an equal right to wind up
partnership affairs, unless otherwise agreed. An exception, under Section 37 and Section 35(3) (b), is made denying the
right to a partner who has become bankrupt. The authority
of each partner, therefore, to bind the firm by engagements
necessary or appropriate to winding up follows as a matter
of course, and the provisions of Sections 33 and 35 are thus
concordant with those of Section 37. The allowable agreement
to the contrary usually takes the form of the partners' selecting one of their number to liquidate, with exclusive authority
for that purpose. The competence of such an arrangement is
unquestioned, and many South Carolina cases furnish instances of it.869 The selection of a partner as sole liquidator
is an exclusion, of course, of the implied authority of the
others; and persons knowing, or charged with notice of, the
restrictions are bound by it, and take the risk involved in
participation in an unauthorized act.870 This is the principle
declared in Section 35 (3) (c), which declares that the partnervivor, who strictly could not be said to have an agency. See MECHEm,
PARTNERSHIP, § 402, n. 6.
Specific acts which illustrate the applicability of the rule of power to
perform acts necessary for winding up are treated in the text hereafter
under Particular Acts.
866. Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra; Tompkins v. Tompkins,
note 550, supra.
867. Poole v. Gist, note 233, supra - partner in dissolved firm of
attorneys who received money on execution for client and did not pay
over, other partner bound.
868. Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra.

869. Lamb v. Saltus, 3

BREVARD'S LAW

130 (S. C. 1813); Foltz v.

Pourie, note 197, supra; Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; Montgomery
v. Montgomery, note 652, supra; Gowan v. Tunno, note 381, supra; Beckham v. Peay, note 264, supra; White v.-Murphy, note 225, supra; Myers
v. Huggins, note 856, supra; Kinsler v. McCants, note 196, supra;
Cameron v. Watson, note 113, supra; Cothran v. Knox, note 595, supra.
The list is probably not exclusive.
870. Beckham v. Peay, note 264, supra.
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ship is not bound by the act of a partner who has no authority
to wind up firm affairs-with qualifications afterwards prescribed.
The appointment of a liquidating partner is not an enlargement of the powers beyond those implied in each partner,
but is merely a restriction upon the right of the others to exercise those powers. Hence, a liquidating partner can do no
more than he could do if he had not been selected. 871 But the
liquidator's authority may be added to by express agreement ;872 and the manifested enlargement of authority will not
be affected by an undisclosed limitation upon it.8 73

If the fact that a partner has been appointed to liquidate
is unknown to a third person dealing with the other partner,
or partners, after dissolution his dealings with the latter will
be shielded. s74 The requirements for the protection of a third
person dealing with a partner who does not have authority
to wind up partnership affairs are set out in Section 35 (3)
(c) (I) (II). It will be noted that protection will be afforded
to such third person under two sets of circumstances: (1) that
he had extended credit prior to dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of want of authority, or (2) if he had not extended credit and had no knowledge of the want of authority,
there had not been constructive notice of dissolution by advertisement as called for by subsection (1) (b) (II). A situation of the kind contemplated in these provisions of the Act
is to be found in White v. Murphy. 75 There, notice of dissolution and of the arrangement that one partner alone was authorized to ,collect the debts of the firm was published in a
871. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra; Fisher v. Tucker, note 280,
supra, at 173; Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; White v. Union Ins.

Co., note 307, supra, at 561.

The general rule is in accord. 68 C. J. S. 868; 50 Am. Jur. 325;

MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 426: "The effect of such an agreement is

not to enlarge the authority of the settling partner, but to exclude the
others from participation."
872. Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra - published authority to one
partner to settle firm affairs and use firm name for purpose, held to
give authority to renew firm note.
873. Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra - agreement that liquidating
partner should apply assets to payment of particular note, and partner
renewed note instead, the renewal having been held to be within the
scope of the express authority, held that limitation not effective as to
payee.
874. Gadsden v. Fayolle, note 225, supra - (syll.) "Any partner is
authorized to receive the debts of the concern, either during the existence
of the copartnership, or after the dissolution, unless a different arrangement is made and notice given of it."
875. Note 225, supra.
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newspaper. The defendant, without actual notice of dissolution and of the arrangement for collection, paid a debt owing
the firm to the partner not authorized to collect. The defendant
was protected in the payment, because of lack of actual notice
of the want of authority in the partner to whom he made payment. To the extent that the case stands for the proposition
that an unknown restriction on authority is not effective, it
still is good law; but the result would be different under the
Act in view of the limiting of protection to those who had
extended credit, and to those who, though they had not extended credit, did not have constructive notice by newspaper
publication. As will be seen hereafter, in the treatment of
Notice of Dissolution, a debtor, under the Act, is not entitled
to actual notice of dissolution; under prior South Carolina
law, any person, including a debtor, having had previous business dealings with the firm was entitled to actual notice or
was affected only by knowledge. It was this view of the law
that accounts for the protection of the debtor in White v.
Murphy. Under the Act the publication would constitute sufficient notice to the debtor to deal only with the liquidating
partner.
The Act in this respect is not altogether satisfactory.
Debtors whose accounts are unpaid on the books of the firm at
the time of dissolution are placed at the mercy of constructive
notice which, in the ordinary course of events, will hardly ever
be transformed into knowledge by reading-something which
will occur even less frequently where the newspaper is published in a place where the debtor does not reside. The foundation for published, instead of actual, notice to persons other
than prior creditors under the Act is (as will be more fully
set out hereafter) the non-disclosure of such persons on the
books of the firm. Debtors of the firm at dissolution are not in
this category; and since the means are at hand for knowing
who the debtors are, consistency ought to require direct notification to them. As a practical matter, that is what a liquidating partner ought to do in any event.
Powers of Surviving Partner. It has been pointed out from
time to time in earlier parts of this article that on the death
of a partner the survivor (and on his death his personal representative) comes under the duty of liquidating the affairs
of the dissolved firm. Hereafter, under Section 37, other fea-
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tures of the rights, duties and accountabilities of the survivor
will be dealt with. The right and the duty to liquidate comprehend the possession of all such powers as may be needed for
the purpose. Generally, the survivor's rights and duties are
defined as follows, in Schenk v. Lewis :87
The surviving partner immediately becomes a trustee
of the entire partnership property for the purpose of
liquidating the affairs of the partnership, and as expeditiously as the circumstances of the partnership will
permit, to convert the assets into cash, pay off the liabilities, adjust the equities between the parties and distribute the remainder of the estate to the surviving partner and the representative of the deceased partner according to their respective interests.
In order to discharge this trust, a surviving partner
is clothed with the power of disposing of the assets of
the partnership by converting them into cash.
Numerous other cases state the proposition that upon the
survivor or survivors devolve the duty and the right to liquipowers in
date,17 7 and most of them spell out the survivor's8 78
substantially the same way as does Schenk,v. Lewis.

876. Note 151, supra, at 242.
877. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra; Kinsler v. McCants,
note 196, supra; Moffatt v. Thompson, note 562, supra; Knox v. Shepler,
note 563, supra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra; Rowell v. Adams,
note 631, supra; Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra; Younts v. Starnes, note
487, supra; Boyd v. Munro, note 759, supra; Manship v. Newton, note
550, supra; Duncan v. Westerlund, note 565, supra; Crews v. Sweet, note
364, supra; Elliott v. Flynn, note 499, supra.
878. Power to pay debts: White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra,
at 559; Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, at 160; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note
269, supra, at 114; Dial v. Agnew, note 488, supra, at 459; Crews v.
Sweet, note 364, supra, at 306.
Power to collect assets, receive payment, and sue therefor: Kinsler v.
McCants, note 196, supra; Moffatt v. Thomson, note 562, supra; Dial v.
Agnew, note 488, supra; Younts v. Starnes, note 487, supra; Duncan v.
Westerlund, note 565, supra; Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra.
Power to sell firm property: White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307,
supra; Tompkins v. Tompkins, note 550, supra, at 21, 22; Crews v.
Sweet, note 364, supra. As to the power to give title to property sold,
see the discussion under Section 25.
These are the usual powers, but it is clear from Schenk v. Lewis that
other acts may be done for the purpose of winding up - such as incurring expenditures for the preservation of firm property.
In Rowell v. Adams, note 631, supra, and Crews v. Sweet, note 364,
supra, the court speaks of the survivor having the authority to continue
the business. What is obviously meant is continuance, so far as is necessary, for the liauidation of the business, and not its continuance as a
going concern. That this is so, see Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra;
Tompkins v. Tompkins, note 550, supra; Schenk v. Lewis, note 151,
supra
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The generalization previously made that a partner after
dissolution cannot bind the partnership by new obligations is
applicable to the surviving partner.8 79 And the other main
generalization-that there is the power to complete unfinished
transactions-also applies to him.8 80
Under the heading of Particular Acts, and subdivisions, attention will be given to the question of the existence or nonexistence of powers to do specific acts. The rules stated there
are applicable to surviving partners as well as to partners
after inter vivos dissolution, unless otherwise noted; and in
some cases the application to surviving partners will be specially mentioned. In other words, the scope of limitation of
powers as they affect surviving partners is not confined to
the material just discussed in this topic.
Powers of Non-Bankrupt Partner. Upon the dissolution of
a partnership by adjudication of the bankruptcy of a partner,
the duty to liquidate devolves upon the non-bankrupt partner
or partners.8 8 ' The duties and powers of the non-bankrupt
partner are substantially the same as those of a surviving
partner.8 2
Particular Acts. Neither the Sections under discussion nor
other portions of the Act point out particular acts as being
authorized or unauthorized after dissolution. The negation of
authority with respect to particular acts under Section 9 (3)
is not duplicated elsewhere with respect to authority after
dissolution. It is doubtful whether the negative provisions of
Section 92(3) are intended to apply after dissolution, since
the whole of Section 9 seems to have as its aim the integrity
of the firm as a going concern. If it should be said that these
express restrictions on authority are confined to existing partnerships, it does not follow, by a form of reverse reasoning,
that the powers there denied are permitted if there has been
dissolution. If the conclusion is that the Section relates only
to the firm prior to dissolution, it would follow that the spe879. See the cases cited in note 858, supra. Of them a surviving partner is involved in White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra, and Tompkins v. Tompkins, note 550, supra. See, also, Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note
269, supra.

880. See the cases cited in note 864, supra, of which Tompkins v.
Tompkins, note 550, supra, concerns a surviving partner.
881. Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra. The duty is also imposed by
the Bankruptcy Act: 11 U. S. C. § 23 (5, i).
882. Crews v. Sweet, note 364, supra.
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cific denials of authority in Section 9 (3) (particularly subsection (3) (c) -- "do any other acts which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business of a partnership"-which is necessarily confined to existing partnerships, and
can have no relationship to dissolution) are not the source of
prohibitions of authority to do similar acts after dissolution;
nor will Subsection 9 (3) work to deny authority to do similar
acts if the power to perform them after dissolution exists at
common law.
Since the Act offers only general principles as to authority,
in which local law concurs, and since, as has been seen, there
is no specification of authorized and unauthorized acts, local
law must be regarded as continuing precedent for the particular situations involved. Some of the acts to be dealt with have
already been touched upon in contrasting them with similar
acts prior to dissolution (under Section 9), but because of
their special relevance at this point they are repeated.
Each partner upon dissolution has the implied authority
to collect and receive payments of firm debts, and give receipt therefor.8s 3 He has the authority also to pay firm
8 84
debts.
While the authority of a surviving partner to sell firm
property, as has already been noted, is clear, the authority to
sell when dissolution is by act of the parties is not so readily
discernible. In one early case it is stated that on such dissolution neither partner can sell more than his interest in the
partnership property.88 5 Other than this statement there is a
lack of authority on the point. If each partner has an equal
883. Gadsden v. Fayolle, note 225, supra; Poole v. Gist, note 233,
supra; Beckham v. Peay, 1 BAILEY'S LAW 121 (S. C. 1828); Kendrick v.
Campbell, note 858, supra; Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra; Sims v.
Smith, note 78, supra. The authority may be denied to all but the liquidating partner. The cases cited under the topic of the Liquidating Partner imply the power in each partner to receive payment.
A fortiori, authority given to a partner to sell property of the firm
carries with it authority to receive payment. Lamb v. Saltus, note 869,
supra.
In Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra, it was held that notice given by a
partner, after dissolution, not to pay the other subjected the debtor to
double payment; but as has already been pointed out, under Restrictions
by Dissent, under Section 9, the payment there was made to a partner
who the debtor knew intended to misapply it. The general rule is that,
in the absence of the appointment of a liquidating partner, one partner
may receive payment from a firm debtor despite communication of dissent by the other. 68 C. J. S. 866.
884. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra; Kendrick v. Campbell,
note 858, supra; Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra.
885. Lamb v. Saltus, note 869, supra.
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right to wind up, it would seem that the power to sell would
necessarily be included. Under the Act, it would appear almost
certainly to be so, especially in view of Section 38, which gives
the right to each partner to be paid off in cash. The general
rule is that the power to dispose of firm stock is possessed
by each partner. 88 0
There is a conflict of opinion as to whether a partner has
the implied authority to borrow money to pay firm obligations.887 The cases which deny the power do so on the elemental ground that after dissolution a partner has no authority to enter into new obligations; those which sanction it
appear to do so on the ground that it may be necessary or
appropriate to winding up. The general prohibition against
the making of new obligations exists, as has been seen, in
South Carolina; and the fact that the new contract may have
relation to an old one is not enough to vacate the prohibition 8 8 8-a point particularly demonstrated hereafter in the
denial of validity to renewals of firm obligations.
On the power to borrow money, South Carolina authority
is comparatively sparse. In at least two cases it seems to be
stated as law that borrowing money for the purpose of discharging firm debts is not an allowable power.8 8 9 In contrast,
a third case seems to permit it, but other factors there-the
possible continuance of the firm by agreement after the term
had expired; the failure, if there was dissolution, to apprise
the public of the fact; the prolonged appearance of firm existence-dilute the effectiveness of the holding in this respect.8 90
Local authority is also scarce with respect to the authority
of the partners after dissolution to effect compromises. The
general rule appears to be that each partner has the power
8 91
to enter into compromises of firm claims and liabilities.
In Union Bank v. Hall, 92 a partner of a dissolved firm which
886. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 423; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 80; 68
C. J. S. 869; 40 Am. Jur. 318.
887. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 80; 68 C. J. S. 868; 40 Am. Jur. 318. As
to a surviving partner's power to borrow money, see 40 Am. Jur. 341.

888. See DeGroot v. Darby, note 470, supra, at 122: "[The partner]
could not, after the dissolution, have bound his former associates on an
original contract, nor was he competent to bind them in a new one, although based on an old one, unless some special authority had been conferred for the purpose."
889. Lamb v. Saltus, note 869, supra; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269,
supra.
890. Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra.
891. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 80; 68 C. J. S. 867; 40 Am. Jur. 322.
892. Note 858, supra.
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during its existence had endorsed the notes of a third person
was held to have the power to consent to the release of the
maker upon a compromise agreement between the maker and
the holder. The court's justification was that the whole transaction was a benefit to, and lessened the liability of, the partners; although the effect of the consent was to continue the
liability of the partners. The underlying premise, however,
on which the case is based may be faulty, since it is stated (at
page 250) ". . . after the dissolution of a co-partnership, one
of the partners cannot create any new liability but he may
keep alive an old one... here no new liability has been created
but an act done which lessens a liability which did exist.
Where the act is done for the benefit of all, his assent is implied." If keeping alive an old contract really involves making
a new one, the prohibition against the latter would control.
Such attempts to keep a contract alive have been discountenanced as they relate to the effect of the Statute of Limitations, since they may amount to a new contract; and the same
is true as to renewal of existing obligations. Of these matters,
there will be more discussion later.
Where, after dissolution, a partner promises to pay a higher rate of interest on a firm debt than the original rate, the
promise is not binding on the late firm.8 93
The restraint against new contracts after dissolution extends to contracts under seal s 9 4 -which, as has been seen under Section 9, are unauthorized during the existence of the
partnership. With respect to conveyances by the surviving
partner, however, it would seem that the whole interest having vested in him, he could transfer firm real estate by deed.
This would be the only effectual method of disposing of real
estate as a means to or incident of winding up. A transfer
by the survivor alone is the necessary consequence of the
change in the law introduced by Section 25 of the Act-as to
which a full discussion has already been had.
A partner of a dissolved firm does not have the authority
to accept service, or authorize an appearance, for his former
partners.8 95
893. Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra8
partner.

894. Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, supra

-

-

promise by surviving

bond given by surviving

partner.
895. Loomis v. Pearson, note 313, supra. See, under Section 9, the

same topic.
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Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, presentment to,
one partner is sufficient to bind the others, even after dissolution ;806 and so is notice of dishonorSor
BILLS AND NOTES. Because it would be the making of a new
contract, a partner after dissolution-whether inter vivos or
caused by death-has no power to make, accept or endorse
commercial paper. The authority which he may have had as
a member of a trading firm to perform these various acts
expires upon the dissolution of the firm. The cases in South
Carolina on the point are plentiful.898 The fact that the making or endorsing partner is the one appointed to liquidate does
not change the rule. 9s
RENEWALS. Although they have relation to and are based
on existing obligations, renewals of firm debts are nonetheless new obligations and fall within the rule preventing imposition of liability in such events. Hence, in whatever way
the renewal may be manifested-by a new or a renewal
note, 0 0 by a new endorsement, 901 or by a bond 9 0 -it will be
ineffective to fasten liability on the non-acting partner or the
estate of a deceased partner.
896. § 6828, S. C. CODE (1942) - "Where the persons primarily liable
on the instrument are liable as partners, and no place of payment is
specified, presentment for payment may be made to any one of them,
even though there has been a dissolution of the firm."
897. § 6850, S. C. CODE (1942) - "Where the parties to be notified
are partners, notice to any partner is notice to the firm, even though
there has been a dissolution."
898. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra - giving promissory note;
Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra - drawing bill or giving promissory
note; Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, note 859, supra- giving promissory
note; Loomis v. Pearson, note 313, supra -same; Irby v. Vining, 2 McCORD's LAw 379 (S.C. 1823) -same; White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307,
supra - endorsement, by surviving partner; Fisher v. Tucker, note 280,
supra, at 170 - endorsement; Galliott ads. Bank, note 859, supra same.
In the cases hereafter noted under Notice of Dissolution in which a
non-assenting partner has been held liable on commercial paper because
of lack of due notice, the inference is plain that the act would not have
bound the partner otherwise. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra giving note; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, supra - giving note.
899. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra. And see Foltz v. Pourie, note
197, supra, at 43, 44; Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, supra, at 171. These
cases have already been noted under the topic of the Liquidating Partner.
900. Foltz v. Pourie, note 197, supra; Martin v. Walton, note 848,
supra; Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, note 859, supra; Hammond v.
Aiken, note 243; supra; Heckheimer v. Allen, note 859, supr'a (disapproving Burris v. Whitner, 3 S.C. 510 (1872) stating the contrary.).
901. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra - by surviving partner;
Galliott ads. Bank, note 859, supra.
902. Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, supra - by surviving partner.
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In addition to the proscription of the cases, denial of the
power to renew is declared by statute :903
No acknowledgment, payment or part payment or renewal of any debt or obligation of a firm, made after
notice of dissolution of the copartnership shall have any
force and effect to bind any member of the firm or continue his liability to pay said copartnership debt, other
than the person by whom such acknowledgment, payment, or part payment or renewal shall be made, or in
any wise affect their right to plead the Statute of Limitations or the presumption of payment from lapse of time.
The authority to enter into renewals may be expressly conferred, and it has been held that authority given to a liquidating partner to use the firm name may be construed as embracing the authority to make a renewal note.90 4 A request
to a bank by a firm to renew notes until the expiration of a
certain time is not authority to a partner to execute a renewal note after dissolution, even though the dissolution takes
place before the end of the requested period. 90 5
PAYMENT OF INDIvIDUAL DEBT WITH FnM FuNDs. It has

already been seen, in the discussion under Section 9, that
South Carolina law appears to sanction a partner's paying.
his individual debts by using firm funds, and to allow a partner to use a firm claim as a setoff against his individual liability to the firm debtor. The cases, however, limit the power,
if it does exist, to transactions prior to dissolution or notice
of dissolution. To put it another way, a partner, after dissolution, has no authority to pay individual debts with firm funds
00
either directly or through the medium of a setoff.9
The
principle is especially applicable to a surviving partner; and
if he pays over firm funds to a firm creditor who is also a
separate creditor of the survivor, the funds must be applied
to the firm debt even without direction as to its application.OT
And where a surviving partner has entered into an unauthorized contract and has thereby become personally and singly
903.
904.
905.
906.

§ 369, S. C. CODE (1942), enacted 1900, 23 STAT. 349.
Myers v. Huggins, note 856, supra.
Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, note 859, supra.
Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra; Beckham v. Peay, note 264, supra;

Sims v. Smith, note 78, supra; McGhee v. Montgomery, note 100, supra.
907. Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, note 269, supra.
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retain by
liable, the person with whom he has dealt cannot
90 8
way of setoff any funds which he owes to the firm.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. An assignment
for the benefit of creditors is one of the unauthorized acts
mentioned in Section 9(3); and it has been observed that
South Carolina law has been changed by that Section. The
rule adopted in Section 9 (3) (a) represents the previously prevailing view, which seems not to be different where dissolution has taken place inter vivos. The great weight of authority,
however, gives to the surviving partner of a firm dissolved
by death the authority to make such an assignment, on the
ground that it can properly fall within the duty and the power
of disposing of firm property and paying debts.90 9 The South
Carolina view is in accord ;910 and while it is based to some
degree upon the power of a partner to make an assignment
prior to dissolution, the liquidating duties and powers of the
survivor are independently sufficient to sustain his authority
to assign. Unless Section 9 (3) is to be treated as a denial of
the power-and, as has already been seen, the more reasonable view is that it does not apply after dissolution-the survivor's authority in this respect remains intact.
ADMISSIONS AND DECLARATIONS.

Since the agency of the

partners persists to a limited extent after dissolution, it
would seem that declarations and admissions made by a partner would be competent to charge the others to the extent that
they relate or have reference to matters within the scope of
his limited authority; or, if he had been given special authority, to matters falling within the sphere of that authority.
Section 11 of the Act is broad enough to apply to admissions
made after dissolution-"An admission or representation
made by any partner concerning partnership affairs within
the scope of his authority as conferred by this Act is evidence
against the partnership." That conclusion is borne out by
the statement in the Commissioners' note: "Admissions before dissolution concerning a particular matter bind the partnership only where the partner has authority to act in the
particular matter; and after dissolution only if necessary to
908. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra.

909. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 403; 68 C. J. S. 774; 4 Am. Jur. 346.
910. White v. Union Ins. Co., note 307, supra. Such assignments ap-

pear elsewhere without mention of the authority of the survivor to make
it. Wilson v. McConnell, note 380, supra.
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wind up the business (emphasis supplied). Where the partner
has no authority to act and the person with whom he is dealing knows he has no authority, or where the admissionis made
after dissolution and is not for the purpose of winding up
partnershipaffairs (emphasis supplied), it should not affect
the partnership."
The general implication in the Commissioners' note that admissions relating to liquidation made by a partner having implied authority to wind up are evidence against the partnership is reflected in South Carolina law.9 1 ' Conversely, where
a partner, by agreement, does not have the authority to wind
up, a statement by him concerning matters incident to9 12winding up is not competent to affect the other partners.
The principal difficulty in applying the general rule as to
admissions arises in connection with transactions prior to
dissolution. American cases are in conflict, but perhaps a majority do not allow admissions or declarations relating to such
transactions.9 1 3 The South Carolina cases follow an irregular
course. In some of the earlier cases such admissions are treated
as incompetent by their very nature.9 14 Others take an opposite view, holding such statements competent without qualification.91 5 One case treats the evidence as competent but not
conclusive. 91 6 Finally, and representing the last word on the
subject, it has been held that the evidence is admissible only
if there is other evidence of the transaction which the admission involves. 91 7 The rule is thus laid down in Fripp v.
Williams :918

... while the general rule is that the statements or admissions of one partner, made after the dissolution of
the partnership, as to what occurred during the existence
911. Beckham v. Peay, note 883, supra.
912. Beckham v. Peay, note 264, supra.
913. See note, 73 A. L. R. 447, 459.
914. Chardon v. Oliphant, note 857, supr - acknowledgment of receipt of goods, stated not to be admissible of itself; White v. Union Ins.
Co., note 307, supra, at 561 - "If one partner, who is authorized to adjust the debts, acknowledges a bill due from the copartnership, it will
not bind his copartner."
915. Simpson ads. Geddes, 2 BAY'S LAW 533 (S. C. 1804) - acknowledgment of debt; Kendrick v. Campbell, note 858, supra - admission
of promise to accept bill of exchange; Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra
-

admission of debt.

916. Fisher v. Tucker, note 280, supra.
917. Meggett v. Finney, note 798a, supra; Fripp v. Williams, note
201, supra.
918. Note 201, supra, at 506.
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of the partnership, are not competent evidence against a
copartner, yet when such evidence is offered after there
has been other evidence adduced of the fact of the partnership and of the existence of the debt or liability referred to in such statements or admissions, they then become admissible.
The South Carolina view as thus expressed is a minority
one, although that group is large.9 19 If the statement in the
Commissioners' note that only declarations relating to winding up are allowable is to be accepted as the meaning to be
given to Section 11, then South Carolina law would probably
undergo a change, since the admission of the creation of an
obligation during the partnership is not an admission made
for the purpose of winding up. But it must be remembered
that the Commissioners' statement is a reflection of a majority
interpretation given to the common law rule expressed in Section 11. The rule as stated in the Section is respected by both
the minority and majority groups; the application of the rule
differs. It would perhaps be not too much to say that Section
11 does not change pre-existing law, and that despite the comment of the Commissioners as to its scope, jurisdictions previously adhering to the rule of admissibility (whether absolute
or qualified) could continue to follow it without misinterpreting the Section or violating the mandate of uniformity.
Strangely, there has been little litigation on the point in jurisdictions having the Act-that is, after the Act had been
adopted. What little there is reveals an adherence to the view
previously accepted by the particular court. 920
The ban against the evidence offered in connection with past
transactions is, as with other types of admissions, directed
against extra-judicial statements, and does not preclude testimony by the partner in an action in which the copartner is a
21
party.
919. See note 73 A. L. R. 447, 465. Most of the jurisdictions in the
minority group hold that the rule against admissions does not apply to
things past and allow declarations as to past transactions without, apparently, requiring substantiating proof as under the South Carolina
rule.
920. Bell v. Porter, 261 Mich. 97, 246 N. W. 93 (1932) - admission
held competent, reference made to Section 11 and other portions of the
Act and to older Michigan law; Lieberman v. Dubin, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 880,
Misc. (1946) - admission held incompetent, no reference to
Act or other authority cited.
921. Allen v. Owens, note 53, supra; Corrie v. Calder, note 56, supra.
The former partner can take the stand to deny as well as to admit.
Kendrick v. Campbell, note 858, supra.
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POWER TO WAIVE OR TOLL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The

problem of the power of one partner after dissolution to make
an acknowledgment, new promise or part payment which
would operate to waive or toll the Statute of Limitations has
been affected to a large extent by the same considerations as
those governing admissions-since an acknowledgment would
be an admission-and by the rules affecting joint debtors. It
would be an unprofitable and needlessly time-consuming enterprise to trace the changes in the law as to the effect of the
acts of joint debtors upon the Statute. Suffice it to say, that
law has undergone marked change, and with it to a large extent has the law as to the effect of acts of the partners.0 22
It would seem that payments and acknowledgments made
by a partner before dissolution would bind the other partners,
at least if the debt had not already been barred, 23 because of
the agency of the partners. The South Carolina case law on
acts after dissolution shows an even greater irregularity than
the law governing admissions, and it has been, in fact, complicated by the latter. In the earliest of the cases it was held
that an acknowledgment by a partner after dissolution would
revive against all the partners a debt already barred by the
Statute. 2 4 It was later held that a promise made by a partner after dissolution could not, as against the other partners,
revitalize a debt already barred at the time of dissolution. 2 1
Finally, it -was held, in Meggett v. FinneyV, 26 that acknowledgment of a debt not barred at the time it was made would toll
the Statute, provided the existence of the debt was otherwise
9 27
proved than by the admission of the partner.
922. For a comprehensive discussion of the effect of acknowledgments
and part payments by a debtor of a joint obligation, see Walters v.
Kraft, 23 S. C. 578, 55 Am. Rep. 44 (1885).
923. Glenn v. Caldwell, note 556, supra, at 178; Sullivan v. Sullivan
Mnfg. Co., 20 S. C. 79 (1883); Zaks v. Elliott, note 59, supra.
924. Higginson v. Air, note 683, supra - acknowledgment by surviv-

ing partner; Veale v. Hassan, note 858, supra (does not appear whether
debt barred at time).
925. Steele v. Jennings, note 858, supra. See, also, Fisher v. Tucker,
note 280, supra.
926. Note 798a, supra.
927. In Bulcken v. Rohde, note 681, supra,the acknowledgment of two
of three partners after suit had been brought that a barred debt was
just and unpaid was denied effectiveness as to all because of the rule
that an acknowledgment, new promise or payment made after the bringing of an action upon the debt is not sufficient to remove the statutory
bar. A fortiori, the third partner could not be bound in any event. It
does not clearly appear whether, at the time of the acknowledgment,
the parties had dissolved the partnership or there had been dissolution
by judicial decree.
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It would seem that, in view of the prohibition against new
contracts by partners after dissolution, an acknowledgment
or part payment would not bind the non-acting partners,
whether the Statute had or had not run at the time of dissolution. The reason is that, whenever they are made such acts
are deemed new contracts and not simply evidence rebutting
a presumption of payment. 928 The complete exposition of this
view was not made until after the cases given above were decided. But there is no need to dwell upon the force of these
cases, for the reason that the recognition of the rule that all
such acts are new obligations-forbidden to partners after
dissolution-is now declared in substance by statute. Attention is again directed to Section 369, S. C. Code (1942)-set
out under Renewals above-which makes acknowledgments
and payments by a partner after dissolution binding only upon
the partner making them. No distinction is made, it will be
observed, between debts already barred and those which are
not; and the effect must therefore be that after dissolution
(unless there is not due notice of the fact), one partner has
no power to bind the other by acknowledgment, part payment
or new promise, whether the Statute has completely run or not.
Notice of Dissolution. Although the agency of the partners
is terminated upon dissolution, except for purposes of fulfilling existing obligations and winding up, it is elemental that
in some cases former members of a firm may nevertheless be
bound by unauthorized transactions of a partner after dissolution, as if dissolution had not occurred. The failure to give
due notice of dissolution to persons entitled to it may offer
the appearance of continued existence of the firm. As to such
persons the partnership is, for all practical purposes, regarded
as existing. The basic reason is estoppel: the semblance of
continued existence and reliance upon it. The principle is
thus stated in the South Carolina case of Simmel v. WilSon:929
That rule, correctly understood, is merely a branch of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, which precludes a person
from denying a state of facts which he has permitted
another to believe continues to exist, when to do so would
work a fraud on the other party.... Obviously, the object
of giving notice is to remove the impression which has
928. See Walters v. Kraft, note 922, supra.
929. Note 848, =pra, at 362, 363.
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been created in the minds of those who have dealt with or
had knowledge of the firm, that certain persons continue
to compose it.
The exposition in Section 35 of the necessity for notice and
its ingredients, and the effect of due notice-or lack of itmay be summarized as follows:
1. Persons who have knowledge or notice of dissolution,
however acquired, and whatever may have been their relation
to or dealings with the firm prior to dissolution, cannot hold
the partnership for the unauthorized acts of a partner. The
term "knowledge" and "notice" are used as defined in Section
3 of the Act.
2. Persons who have extended credit to the partnership
prior to dissolution are entitled to special or particular notice.
Failure to give it creates liability, in the absence of knowledge.
3. Persons who have not extended credit to the partnership
but who had knowledge of its existence prior to dissolution,
whether there were or were not dealings of another kind with
the firm, are not entitled to actual notice. As to them publication of the fact of dissolution-as prescribed-is sufficient to
cut off future liability.
It is not clear what is meant by the language "known of
the partnership prior to dissolution," in subsection (1) (b) (II)
-whether the third person must have known only that he was
dealing with a firm, or that he must have known who the
members of the firm were. Assuming that the rule reflects
majority opinion, it should be the former.93 0 The rule in subsection (2) relating to the dormant partner, who alone of
the partners is not required to give notice, would seem to
strengthen this conclusion. Moreover, a person is not a dormant partner because he is not known to the persons dealing
with the firm-there must be both secrecy and passivity.93 '

Hence, it is possible to know of the partnership without knowing who compose it.
4. Persons who have neither extended credit to the firm
nor had knowledge of its existence are not entitled to either
actual or newspaper notice. As to such persons no liability is
930. See MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 397, n. 25; 68 C. J. S. 876.
931. See the definition in the South Carolina case of Allen v. Davids,
note 15, supra: ". . . a partner who takes no part in the business and
whose connection with it is unknown." As to the liability of dormant
partners see that topic under Section 9.
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created against the non-assenting partners. This conclusion
does not affirmatively appear in the Act, but it is a necessary
implication, as such persons are not mentioned as parties who
may hold the partnership for unauthorized acts in the absence
of notice.
5. Dormant partners--as used in the strict sense, and so
substantially defined in subdivisions (a) and (b) of subsection
(2)-need not give actual or newspaper notice to escape personal liability for subsequent acts. The partnership assets
must, however, respond if notice is not given as prescribed
in subsection (1) (b). The relaxation of the requirement of notice in the case of a dormant partner is due essentially to the
fact that since his connection with the firm is unknown, there
is no basis for estoppel. But the prerequisite for dispensing
with notice is not merely that the partner be unknown but
so far inactive in the firm's affairs "that the business reputation of the partnership cannot be said to have been in any
degree due to his connection with it." There may be a degree
of inconsistency in invoking an estoppel where the fact of
membership is unknown but the partner is active-the latter
circumstance being one which may not be a cause of inducement to or reliance by third persons. But the rule as stated
represents the prevailing American view; and if the partner
is not strictly dormant in the sense used, avoidance of liability
can be had only under the conditions detailed in subsection
(1) (b) and its subdivisions.
Matching up South Carolina case law with the numbered
paraphrased rules, the decisions appear to take these positions:
First. They hold substantially as in the first numbered
item: knowledge of dissolution prevents liability from attaching against the non-assenting partner, whatever may have
93 2
been the previous relation of the third person to the firm.
Obviously, the party cannot complain that he has been misled.
932. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra - prior creditor, newspaper
notice only; Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, note 859, supra - prior creditor, newspaper notice only; Irby v. Vining, note 898, supra - generally;
Galliott ads. Bank, note 859, supra - prior creditor, newspaper notice
only; Steele v. Jennings, note 858, supra - prior creditor, no special or
published notice; Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra - generally, no
special or published notice, no prior knowledge of or dealing with firm;
Goodrich v. Barron, note 95, supra (diss. op.).
In the cases in which there was newspaper notice only and the party
was entitled to special notice, proof that the published notice was read
or must have been read furnished the proof of actual knowledge, which
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Second. The local decisions are in accord with the second
of the rules: persons previously extending credit to the firm
are entitled to actual-or as some of the cases put it, special
or particular-notice. 933 Newspaper advertisement is not sufficient, 934 nor are other attempts at notice which are not
brought home to the prior creditor.9 35 Nor is general or public
notoriety sufficient if the fact is that the creditor does not
know of the dissolution9s3a
Third. The South Carolina cases are not wholly in accord
with the Act as to those persons who are affected by newspaper notice alone. It will be observed that, under the Act,
special notice has to be given only to those who have extended
credit. The Commissioners' note to Section 35 states as the
-reason for excluding those who have not extended credit, although they may have had other business transactions with
the firm, "the practical impossibility of the partners knowing, by any feasible system of bookkeeping, all the persons
with whom they have dealings, unless credit has been extended." The South Carolina cases call for actual notice to all
who have had prior dealings, whether as creditors or cuswas sufficient. While publication is not of itself notice where special
notice is required, the fact of publication is a pertinent element of proof
as to the existence of knowledge. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; Galliott ads. Bank, note 859, supra; White v. Murphy, note 225, supra;
Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra. Even where there is no newspaper
publication, a report of dissolution to a commercial agency, if read, is
sufficient; and notification of dissolution to such an agency is evidence.
Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra.
933. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra; Brown v. Foster, note 459,
supra; Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra. In the cases cited in note 932,
supra, in which the creditor was held bound by knowledge although there
was only newspaper notice, the inference is plain that, in the absence
of knowledge, special notice must be given. Where there is neither
special notice nor newspaper notice to a person entitled to special notice,
the case is, of course, even stronger in his favor. Halls v. Coe, note 196,
supra; Burris v. Whitner, note 900, supra; Brown v. Foster, note 459,
supra; Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra.
934. The fact that the creditor is a subscriber to the paper in which
the notice of dissolution appears is not sufficient to charge him with
notice, although it is evidence on the question of knowledge. Burris v.
Whitner, note 900, supra. See, also, Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra.
935. Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, supra. Posting of notice of sale of
business including statement of dissolution at firm's store not sufficient.
Although here the third person was not entitled to special notice because there had been no previous dealings and was entitled to only newspaper notice, which was not given, the principle would cover both
cases. But posting of a notice is an important admissible fact, especially where the parties reside in the same community. Irby v. Vining,
note 898, supra. The plaintiff here was entitled to special notice; he
had neither that nor newspaper notice.
935a. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra.
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tomers. 3 6 To the extent, therefore, that prior dealers entitled
to special notice may have included those who have not extended credit, the Act changes the law: such persons are not
entitled to special notice and are bound by newspaper publication.
As it affects the remaining class of persons-those who
have had knowledge of the firm but no previous dealings with
it-South Carolina law coincides with the Act: such persons.
are entitled to and are affected by newspaper notice alone.9 37
The rule and its rationale are thus stated, in Hammond v.
Aiken :93

The severance of the partnership should be made as notorious as the partnership itself was. Accordingly, it has.
been decided that particular persons such as those having
had dealings with the firm, must have particular knowledge. If sufficient notice is not given, all the members,
will be held liable for the contracts made by their copartner ....

Notice in the gazette is sufficient to those

who have had no previous dealings with the firm.93 9

Under the Act the only effective equivalent of newspaper
advertisement to those affected by it is knowledge or actual
notice; no other constructive substitute for the "general notice" which publication produces is offered by the Act. (An
exception might be present in a case where no newspaper was
published at the place of business of the partnership.) In this
respect there may be a change in the older law, for it seems.
936. Irby v. Vining, note 898, supra; White v. Murphy, note 225,
supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, supra. See, also, Simmel v. Wilson,
note 848, supra, at 363. Some of the cases speak of persons having "dealings" as entitled to notice, although the particular litigant there involved was a creditor. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; Bank of S. C.
v. Humphreys, note 859, supra.
937. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; White v. Murphy, note 225,
supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243, supra; Simmel v. Wilson, note 848,
supra. In these cases, except Hammond v. Aiken, there is the statement,
or at least the intimation, that published notice is conclusive as to persons who have had no prior dealings with the firm.
The failure to give publication notice is evidence on the question of
whether there was dissolution in fact. Metz v. Commercial Bank, note
15, supra.
938. Note 243, supra, at 121. The quoted language is still sound law
except as to the change separating prior dealers into creditors and those
having other business relations.
939. See, also, Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra, at 364: "Unquestionably, strangers to the firm, who had not dealt with it, but who had
knowledge of it, would be entitled to as definite notice of its dissolution
as they had of its existence."
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to have been held that other ways of making the fact publicly
known were sufficient to charge such persons. It has been
said that ". . advertisement in a newspaper is not the exclusive test of compliance with the outgoing partner's obligation to give 'general notice.' As pointed out in Lovejoy v.
Spafford, 93 U. S. 430, 23 L. Ed. 851 [1876]: 'It is not an absolute, inflexible rule that there must be a publication in a
newspaper to protect a retiring partner. Notice of the dissolution in any other public or notorious manner is proper to be
considered on the question of notice.' "940 Even if the Act
changes the law in this particular, it is quite clear that public
notoriety may nevertheless be a relevant circumstance bearing
on the question of knowledge.
Fourth. The rule deduced in item 4 is a logical answer to
the elements necessary to invoke estoppel: persons who have
had no dealings with or knowledge of the firm cannot show
the preliminary fact on which reliance can be based. Only one
case of the kind appears in the South Carolina reports-SimmeZ v. Wilson 941-and it is full and to the point, stating the
proposition that a person who had never dealt with the firm
nor knew of its existence and who its members were, was not
entitled to either actual or newspaper notice. The case follows
the undoubted weight of authority.942 It will be noticed that
the rule of Simmel v. Wilson contemplates lack of knowledge
not merely of the firm, but of those who compose it. Whether
knowledge of the membership of the firm continues to be a
requisite under the Act is a question to be considered in the
light of the observations made in item 3 in connection with
the language in subsection (1) (b) (II) -"known of the partnership."
Fifth. One South Carolina case deals with the undisclosed
partner. In Brown v. Foster,943 a partner termed a "secret"
partner was held liable for purchases made by his copartner
after the former's retirement from the firm-there being
neither special nor newspaper notice. It does not appear
whether, in addition to being generally unknown, the partner
was active or not; but the case is decided basically on the
940. Sinmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra, at 364. Undoubtedly this has
been the general rule. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 394; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 81; 68 C. J. S. 879.
941. Note 848, supra.
942. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 393; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 81; 68
C. J. S. 876; 40 Am. Jur. 310, 311.
943. Note 459, supra.
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ground that the "secret" partner's membership in the firm
was known to the creditor, with whom he had had dealings
in the obtaining of credit. The rule of this case cannot be said
to be in conflict with the Act, since even though he might
have been a dormant partner, he was not one so far as the
particular creditor was concerned-a situation covered precisely by subsection (2) (a) ; nor does it run counter to the
general rule, which has it that even with a dormant or secret
partner, notice must be given to persons who knew of his
connection with the firm. 944
Some incidental observations are in order on the question
of notice. Whether in a given case knowledge has been acquired or due notice given is a question of fact triable by a
jury.94" If the evidence, or lack of it, points only one way, the
issue of course is no longer for the jury's consideration. 94 6
General or public notoriety, or other circulation of the fact
of dissolution, is a relevant factor bearing on the issue of
actual knowledge ;947 but testimony of a witness that the dissolution was known to the community is regarded as calling
for an expression of opinion, and incompetent as hearsay. 94 8
The notice by which a party is to be charged must be given to,
or acquired by, the party himself or one authorized to receive
it; and notice given to the selling clerk of a merchant who had
previously extended credit is not proper notice. 949 Where a
partnership is formed for a single transaction notice of dissolution may be inferred if the transaction for which it was
formed has been completed. 95 0
The effect of the failure to give due notice, where knowledge
is absent, is to make the non-assenting partner liable for any
act which was within the scope of the acting partner's authority as if there had been no dissolution. Thus, the non-assenting partner has been bound by a payment made to the
944. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 397; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 81; 69
C. J. S. 875; 40 Am. Jur. 259.
945. Martin v. Walton, note 848, supra; Irby v. Vining, note 898,
supra; White v. Murphy, note 225, supra; Brown v. Foster, note 459,
supra; Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra; Goodrich v. Barron, note 95,
supra (diss. op.).

946. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra; Galliott ads. Bank, note 859,
supra. See, also, Bank of S. C. v. Humphreys, note 859, supra; Steele v.
Jennings, note 858, supra.
947. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243,
supra; Simmel v. Wilson, note 848, supra.
948. Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra.
949. Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra. The requirements for notice
under the Act are set out in Section 3.
950. Williams v. Connor, note 59, supra.
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other by setoff of a firm claim against the acting partner's
individual debt;951 by notes and renewals ;952 by purchases;353
by the payment to one other than the liquidating partner.9
In contrast, where the act is not within the scope of authority
during the life of the partnership, no liability is created, even
though due notice is not given.9 55
Having observed the principles announced in the South
Carolina cases, and the respects in which they may have been
affirmed or modified by the Act, it remains to be considered
how these principles and the Act are affected by other statutory law. Here we must contend with a statute that has been
a source of embarrassment and uncertainty before the passage
of the Act and that will undoubtedly prove even more so since
its adoption. In the article of the Code in which the Firm
Name Statutes are embraced9 58 appears the following:
In case there be any change in the owner or owners, proprietor or proprietors, of any such mercantile or industrial establishment, any person retiring from such ownership or proprietorship shall file in the office of the clerk
of court of the county in which the principal place of business of such mercantile or industrial establishment is located, a notice of such change, and shall have the sign or
signs herein changed, and until both such notice shall
be filed and such change made on such signs, such person shall be liable for all debts and contracts of such
mercantile or industrial establishment according to the
957
interest he or she formerly had therein.
Only a single case deals with the meaning and operation
of this statute. In Goodrich v. Barron,958 the defendants had

951. Halls v. Coe, note 196, supra.

952. Lamb v. Singleton, note 857, supra; Hammond v. Aiken, note 243,
supra; Burris v. Whitner, note 900, supra.

953. Brown v. Foster, note 459, supra; Goodrich v. Barron, note 95,

supra.

954. White v. Murphy, note 225, supra.
955. Hamond v. Aiken, note 243, supra-

note in firm name to secure

individual debt.
956. Art. 3 of Chap. 155 (§§ 7825-7828), S. C. CODE (1942).
957. § 7826, S. C. CODE (1942), enacted 1918, 30 STAT. 879. § 7828,

S. C. CODE (1942) makes it a misdemeanor to fail to comply with the

requirements for filing notice of composition of the firm and notice of
dissolution or change and fixes the penalty therefor.

958. Note 95, supra.
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been partners doing business under the name "B & M Motor
Company." They dissolved the partnership. The named defendant continued to operate the business under the same
firm name and bought goods from the plaintiff, for the purchase price of which the action was brought against both
former partners. The record shows that there was no published notice of dissolution, and that there was no prior filing
of notice of the membership of the firm in the office of the
clerk of court. Both the record and the report show that there
was no filing of notice of dissolution. The trial judge directed
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, apparently because of the
failure to file notice of retirement, but later set it aside, with
the explanation that he had misconstrued the statute. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, ordering the reinstatement
of the verdict in the plaintiff's favor. The court declared (at
p. 343), "This is a case of statutory construction, pure and
simple ;" and (at p. 344), "The admitted facts are that no notice was filed, and the original order directing a verdict was
correct and it was error of law to set aside the verdict." The
court had Simmel v. Wilson"9 59 before it in argument but
reached its conclusion without reference to it or other authority and only on the basis of the statute, declaring that
none of the cases cited by the respondent had construed the
statute. Concurring in the majority opinion was the Justice
who wrote the opinion in Simmel v. Wilson. Although there
was a conflict in the testimony as to actual knowledge of dissolution, that issue was not sent back for a new trial. The
record does not clearly reveal whether the plaintiff had had
previous dealings with the firm or knew of its existence before dissolution. Here, therefore, seem to be a point-blank assertion that the failure to file a certificate of dissolution ipso
facto and conclusively renders a non-assenting former partner
liable. The statute as applied in Goodrich v. Barron and the
provisions of Section 35 of the Act raise these questions:
(1) Is the statute in pan materri and harmonious with the
Act, or has it been repealed by the Act? (Section 44 contains
the usual repealer clause.) It may well be that since the Act
is, with respect to notice, largely a declaration of pre-existing
law, the statute retains its original vigor so far as it relates
to partners. On the other hand, it may be argued that the Act
959. Note 848, supra. The statute had been adopted before the appeal in this case, but dissolution had taken place before its adoption.
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being the latest expression of the legislative will, its prescription as to notice in Section 35 is exclusive and overrides the
statute.
(2) If the statute is treated as not repealed:
(a) Is the statute to be limited to cases where there has
been a filing of a certificate of membership and no filing of
certificate of dissolution? Apparently not, since in Goodrich
v. Barron no prior certificate of membership had been filed.
(b) If special notice had been given to a prior creditor of
the firm's dissolution, does a failure to file certificate of dissolution nevertheless impose liability? It would be difficult
to justify such liability, since the creditor would know that
he was not dealing with, and had not made a contract with,
the retiring partner. Yet, if the statute is regarded as other
than remedial that might occur, under Goodrich v. Barron.
(c) If the third person had known of the firm prior to
dissolution but had not extended credit, and newspaper notice
had been given, would failure to file the certificate create
liability? The answer would seem to be in the affirmative,
if the logic of Goodrichv. Barronis accepted.
(d) If due notice is not given by direct notification or
newspaper publication to one entitled, as the case may be,
would actual knowledge of dissolution preclude liability despite the statute? The answer should be based on the same
observations as in (b). In Goodrich v. Barron the issue of
knowledge never reached the jury; and the net effect was to
cut off any inquiry into the existence of knowledge once the
showing of non-filing was made.
(e) What is the effect of the statute upon the dormant
partner? Under the Act he need not give notice. Must he,
nevertheless, file the certificate of dissolution? The logic of
Goodrich v. Barron, which is not based on principles of estoppel, might demand an affirmative answer. In practice it
is less than likely that a partner who has cloaked his association with the firm would now reveal it by publicizing in the
clerk of court's office the fact of dissolution. Nothing, however, would prevent him from doing so any more than his
"playing safe" by giving newspaper notice. After all, he may
not be as dormant as he thinks.
(f) If the third person seeking to hold the non-assenting
partner had no previous dealings with or knowledge of the
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firm, would failure to file notice subject the partner to liability? Would the result under facts identical with those in
Simmel v. Wilson be different if the notice was not filed?
There might be such a difference if Goodrich v. Barron is
logically followed out, although the result would be conspicuously unjust.
(g) Is the doctrine of Goodrich v. Barron limited to transactions where, as there, the business had been conducted in
a distinctive firm name and the contract on which liability
was sought was also made in that name? A court, realizing the
harsh consequences of pushing the logic of the case to its
extreme, might draw the line against its application to a different set of facts; but the result would have to be explained
away by more than a mere distinction in the facts.
(h) Would filing of a certificate of dissolution be sufficient
in itself, if actual notice or newspaper publication had not
taken place? It would be unreasonable to assume that it would;
to do so would nullify the provisions of Section 35. Moreover,
such a filing should be no more constructive notice of the dissolution than filing of the notice of membership
is construc9 60
tive notice of that fact-which it is not.
Whatever may be the answers to the questions posed, it is
clear that there are uncertainties and potential harassment
in the co-existence of the statute and the Act. If the letter
of the Act is not violated by the statute, its spirit undeniably
is: the Act being based on just principles of estoppel. The only
reasonable relation of the imposition of liability by the statute
to a set of facts is where the facts consist of the filing of a
prior certificate of membership which is unchanged after dissolution and reliance is had on the resulting appearance of
unaltered membership. Other than this, there is no rational
justification for creation of liability in favor of one who extends credit to the unauthorized former partner. Penalizing
provisions, which do not give the third person a windfall, are
found elsewhere. 961 The matter of changing the sign offers its
own set of nagging perplexities, and virtually the same questions already asked might be put in this connection, plus a
few others. These suggest themselves.
NOTICE OF DISSOLUTION TO PARTNERS. Section 34 deals with

infrequent situations. The situation presented in subsection
960. Franklin Savings Bank v. Riddle, note 96, supra.
961. § 7828, S. C. CODE (1942), mentioned in note 957, supra.
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(a) may be illustrated as follows: A, B and G are partners,
The partnership is dissolved by A, acting in accordance with
the partnership agreement or in contravention of it. B, in
ignorance of the dissolution, enters into a contract in the ordinary course of business. Both A and C are, and should be,
liable to contribute to B. Such situations are bound to be
rare, because where dissolution is by act of the parties the
chance of any one of the partners not knowing of it is remote.
If the partnership is at will, dissolution at the will of a partner does not occur until all have been notified; if the partnership is for a specific term or undertaking and dissolution is
by mutual consent, clearly all the parties must know of it.
Even where the dissolution is in breach of the agreement, it
is only the "express will" of the breaching partner that produces it. But there may be "notice" without "knowledge";
and it is only "knowledge", as that is defined in the Act,
that will disable the acting partner to recover contribution. The infrequency of the situations contemplated by Section 34 (a) is revealed by the fact that there are no cases
since the first state adoption of the Act that deal with them.
No South Carolina cases touch on the problem, and the Act
therefore introduces new law.
The Commissioners' note states that subsection (b) makea
a change in the law. The common law rule is that the death or
bankruptcy of a partner is a fact of which every member of
the public must take notice, including the other partners; in
effect, that death or bankruptcy of a partner in itself constitutes constructive notice of that fact, and with it the fact
of dissolution. Accordingly, to illustrate the rule, if A, of the
firm of A, B and C, dies or becomes bankrupt, the publicincluding B and C--is charged with notice of the fact. If B,
not knowing of A's death or bankruptcy, enters into a contract in the ordinary course of business he would be performing an unauthorized act for which neither C nor the estate of
A would be liable and on account of which B would not be entitled to indemnity or contribution from C or the estate of A.
The rule as thus illustrated coincides with the agency rule,
which denies indemnity to an agent who incurs liability in
ignorance of the termination of the agency.96 2 Under the Act,
however, if B, in the case given, had neither notice nor knowl962. RESTATEMENT Op AGENCY, §§ 120, 451. But otherwise if there is
agreement to indemnify. § 386.
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edge of A's death, he could obtain contribution from C. The
aubsection apparently does not go so far as to allow B to obtain contribution from A's estate. The language is "each
-partner (emphasis supplied) is liable to his copartners." This
-would seem to exclude the estate of a deceased partner and
the estate of a bankrupt partner. Moreover, the Commiszioners' note, in referring to the case of a bankrupt partner,
declares: "What has been said of the death of a partner also
applies to the bankruptcy of a partner. If there are a number
of partners, and one of them becomes bankrupt, and another
having no knowledge or notice of this fact makes a contract
in the ordinary course of business, there appears no reason
why he should not be able to call on his other partners not
bankrupt or deceased (emphasis supplied) to contribute toward any loss which his separate estate may sustain on account of the contract."
The basic change in the law to which the Commissioners refer in their note occurs in the rule of effective termination
of authority on death-the absolute destruction of power without regard to whether the acting partner or the person with
whom he deals knows of the copartner's death. This is, of
course, the agency rule as well, subject to the "agency coupled
with an interest" exception.9 63 The note states that the change
consists in the adoption of the modification which appears in
some of the agency cases, 964 and enacted into law by the statutes of some of the states. The chief tenor of these cases and
statutes is that protection is afforded to third persons who
deal bona fide with an agent in ignorance of the principal's
death. The note lists among the statutes a South Carolina one
-Gen. Stat. (1882), Sec. 1302.96 5 But while the Commission963. RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, § 120.
964. See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY (3d Ed.),

§ 209; note, 39 Am.
Dec. 81.
965. Now § 7018, S. C. CODE (1942): "Act of Agent Good, Though
Principal be Dead. If any agent, constituted by power of attorney or
authority, shall do any act for his principal which would be lawful if
such principal were living, the same shall be valid and binding on the
estate of said principal, although he or she may have died before such
act was done. Provided, the party dealing with such agent dealt with
muh
agent bona fide, not knowing at the time of the doing of such act
that the principal was dead." This statute was enacted in 1828: 6 STAT.
359. An amendment, not included above, was added in 1945 to cover
special cases of persons in military service. 44 STAT. 60. The statute
does not seem to have been interpreted, and specifically, there are no
cases holding it applicable to partnerships.
There is a similar statute protecting a third person dealing bona fide
with an agent after the principal's death where the agent has trans-
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ers' thesis purports to conform to a modified rule which binds,
the principal's estate it will be observed again that, as the
Commissioners explain it, the subsection goes no further than
to give an indemnifying or contributory right against the living partners. It is submitted that actually the modified agency
rule is not followed substantially. The point of resemblance
is a continuance of authority after a partner's death by reason of the acting partner's lack of knowledge or notice; but
here the resemblance stops, and the main force of the modified
rule which is directed against the deceased principal's estateis not exerted. If these conclusions be true, it follows that,
in the event of the death or bankruptcy of A-of the firm of
A, B and C-B can obtain contribution from C but not from
A's estate. And, by the same token, if the firm consists of
only A and B, and B in ignorance of A's death contracts a
new obligation, there could be no recovery at all. The likelihood of one of the partners in a firm of two not knowing of
the other's death is, of course, very small.
NOTICE TO THIRD PERSONS OF DISSOLUTION CAUSED BY
DEATH OR BANKRUPTCY. It has always been the accepted rule

that dissolution caused by operation of law, as distinguished
from dissolution caused by act of the parties, carries its own
notice. The event-death, bankruptcy, subsequent illegality,
war-is deemed a matter of which the public must take notice;
and, unlike dissolution by act, no notice is necessary, to prior
creditors or others, to relieve the other partner or the estate
of the deceased or bankrupt partner from liability for future
unauthorized acts. Particularly, with dissolution caused by
death, not only is the deceased partner's estate absolved from
future liability, but the other survivors are as well.9 67
Section 35 of the Act makes no exception in its requirements for notice where the firm is dissolved by death or bankruptcy. It puts subsequent illegality into an excepted category by subsection (3) (a); so that when a firm is dissolved
by reason of such illegality the fact that a third person dealing
with one of the partners may not know of the supervening
ferred a bill or note made or endorsed by the principal. It has not been
construed. § 7019, S. C. CODE (1942), enacted 1828, 6 STAT. 359.
9.66. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 388; CRANE,

§

81;

68 C. J. S. 875; 40

Am. Jur. 309.
It has been said that dissolution by judicial decree falls in this category. MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP, § 388; Commissioners' note to Section 34.
967. The leading American case is Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen 287

(Mass. 1861).
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circumstance which has thus put an end to the partnership
will not furnish him an otherwise valid ground to hold the
other partners. This exception has been criticized as arbitrary
and unfair.0 8
The failure to specifically take dissolution by death or bankruptcy out of the general requirements of notice, and the particularizing of subsequent illegality as not affected by the
requirements for notice, apparently indicate an intention to
put dissolution by death or bankruptcy in the same class as
dissolution by act of the parties so far as necessity for notice
is concerned. 96 This being so, notice of death or bankruptcy
(what of dissolution by judicial decree?) is not imputed to
the public. Yet, even so, there is some murkiness here. If
we take the case of the firm of A, B and C, which has been
dissolved by the death of A, an unauthorized transaction
by B with D in the ordinary course of his business would bind
C. It is assumed that D is a person entitled to direct notice as
a creditor or to newspaper notice as a person having knowledge of the firm prior to dissolution, and that due notice has
not been given and he has no knowledge of A's death. The
imposition of liability against C is symmetrical with the imposition of similar liability under Section 34. But is A's estate
liable to D? At first blush, it would seem that it would be.
Yet who is to give the notice? It is true that notice is effective no matter who gives it, provided it is duly given. But if
the survivor does not give notice of dissolution caused by A's
death, does a duty fall upon A's representative-who does not
have possession of the firm books-to give notice in order to
protect the estate in his charge from future liabilities? It
would be fantastic to suppose that an advertisement directed
to the deceased's creditors would be constructive notice to
future firm creditors whose claims would arise only after the
partner's death. The surviving partners? One of them might
give notice to protect himself against the unauthorized acts of
his co-survivors; but he would hardly do so to protect anyone
but himself. And if the firm consisted of only two partners,
the partner violating a duty toward the estate of his copart968. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 81; CRANE, The Uniform Partnership

Act. a Criticism, 28 HARv. L. R. 762, 782 (1915).

969. At least that is what eminent authorities seem to believe:
PARTNERSHIP, § 388; CRANE, PARTNERSHIP, § 81; 28 HARv.

MECHENM,

L. R. 762, 782 (1915).
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ner by incurring unauthorized liabilities would not, out of
character, give notice to protect against his own act.
In the event of bankruptcy, would the trustee be under a
duty to give notice to creditors who were not and could not be
listed? Would official published notice by the trustee constitute constructive notice to those persons of the dissolution of
the firm? It will be noted that under Section 35 (3) (b) the
partnership is not bound in any event where the partner acting is bankrupt. Notice is imputed by this subsection to the
person with whom he deals of the acting partner's bankruptcy.
Why should notice be imputed here and not when the non-acting partner is bankrupt? The possibilities and probabilities
of the third person's knowledge are as great, or as small, in
one case as in the other.
Further, if we accept as correct the premise that Section
34 (b) does not give a partner incurring liability in ignorance
of the death or bankruptcy of a copartner the right to contribution against the deceased or bankrupt partner's estate,
then to allow a third person to recover against the estate of
one or the other would produce a major contradiction. Thus,
as has been seen, B, having no knowledge or notice of A's
death or bankruptcy, can recover contribution from C, the
living copartner, but not from A's estate; or if the firm is that
of A and B, he cannot recover at all. Can D, a third person
with whom B deals, recover from A's estate, while B, who
might equally be out of pocket if he paid D, is to be denied the
right?
No cases in jurisdictions in which the Act is in force have
up to now dealt with this phase of the problem of notice, and
one must be resigned to the obscureness of the Act in this respect. Nor do the Commissioners' notes offer any comment
on this point unless the comments to Section 34-which have
been touched upon-are intended to carry over into Section 35.
There are no South Carolina cases that deal with the matter.
The South Carolina statute which has already been noted as
offering protection to persons dealing bonw fide with an agent
and in ignorance of the principal's death can scarcely be
stretched into a formula for partners. 970
Holding Out as Partner After Dissolution. Subsection (4)
of Section 35 emphasizes that the principle of estoppel by
970. See note 965, supra.
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holding out is not affected by Section 35. Thus, even if there
has been dissolution, an estoppel may arise where a former
partner holds himself out, or allows himself to be held out, as
a partner, and a third person relies upon it. The case would
hardly arise if there had been actual notice to, or knowledge
by, a prior creditor or other party of dissolution: if he knew
of dissolution, he could hardly be deemed to rely upon appearances to the contrary. If there was holding out, that might,
as to such persons, create the impression of a new partnership,
but not a well-founded belief of continuance of the old one. But
with persons affected by newspaper notice, and those entitled
to no notice at all, estoppel could easily arise out of such conduct. The continued use of the firm name, the employment
of the firm stationery without change, failure to alter the firm
sign, seemingly conducting the business as a going concernare all elements to be considered. They are relevant on the
question of whether there was dissolution in fact-since their
prolonged use might be a circumstance bearing upon the continuance of the partnership ;971 but even where dissolution has
concededly taken place, these courses of conduct may well lead
others to believe that it had not occurred. No South Carolina
cases deal directly with estoppel after dissolution by holding
out, although there are facts in some of them that could have
constituted the basis of controversial issue on the point if the
972
cases had not been decided on other grounds.
(To be concluded)
[EDITOR'S NOTE:

Due to limitations of space the concluding

portion of Professor Karesh's article will appear in the next

issue of the QUARTERLY.]

971. Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra. See, also, Simmel v.
Wilson, note 848, supra.
972. See Metz v. Commercial Bank, note 15, supra -

no change in

firm name or use of sign, and continuity of business; Simmel v. Wilson,
note 848, supra - continued use of firm name and stationery, latter,
however, showing only name of partner continuing business following
firm name; Goodrich v. Barron, note 95, supra - continued use of firm
name and stationery. In the last two cases, there is no development of
facts as to whether the retiring partner consented to the continued use
of the firm name.
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